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In today’s scale-driven and technology-intensive global economy, collaboration becomes 
the supply chain’s core capability (Liker and Choi, 2004). A well-developed ability to create and 
sustain fruitful collaborations gives companies a significant competitive advantage (Kanter, 
1994). Retailers are increasingly relying on their suppliers to reduce costs, improve quality, and 
develop new processes and products faster than their rivals’ vendors can. On the other hand, 
suppliers benefit from retailers that they are able to monitor store-level demand in real time in 
order to ensure the top-selling items are in-stock or the accuracy and timeliness of retailer’s 
demand forecast. Previous literature has shown various ways to promote collaboration in buyer-
supplier relationships, but it may also have negative impacts such as deception (Gneezy, 2005), 
dishonesty (Mazar et al., 2008), or opportunism (John, 1984). This dissertation aims to 
investigate the impact of two types of identity (induced group identity and natural identity) on 
discretionary collaborative behaviors without any monetary incentives and supply chain 
performance in buyer-supplier relationships. 
Using social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), Essay 1 explores the influence of 
buyer-supplier identification which is defined as perceived oneness of a supplier/buyer with its 
partner’s organization and experience of its partner’s successes and failures as its own (Ashforth 
and Mael, 1989) on collaboration and supply chain performance, and the foundation and 
formation of buyer-supplier identification. To explore the effect of natural identity, particularly, 
gender identity, Essay 2 addresses the impact of gender composition in buyer-supplier 
relationships on collaboration, and supply chain performance. It investigates whether females 
and males exhibit differences in trust and trustworthiness. Controlled laboratory experiments are 
executed for Essays 1 and 2.  
Together the two essays bring the concept of identity to supply chain management 
literature and advance our understanding of the enablers and drivers that can increase buyer-
supplier collaboration and supply chain performance.  
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 “On July 15, 2014, Apple and IBM announced an exclusive partnership that teams the 
market—leading strengths of each company to transform enterprise mobility through a 
new class of business apps—bringing IBM’s big data and analytics capabilities to iPhone 
and iPad.” 
----Apple Press Info 
 In today’s scale-driven and technology-intensive global economy, collaboration is the 
supply chain’s lifeblood (Liker and Choi, 2004). Companies build their ability to create and 
sustain collaborations to add new blood to their business and maintain their competitive 
advantage (Kanter, 1994). Collaboration can benefit firms. For example, in buyer-supplier 
relationships, retailers can obtain benefits such as cost reduction, quality improvement, and 
product and process development by collaborating with their suppliers. On the other hand, 
suppliers benefit from retailers that they can monitor store-level demand in real time to ensure 
the top-selling items are in-stock or the accuracy and timeliness of retailer’s demand forecast 
through collaboration. For example, Apple and IBM decide to collaborate that IBM uses their big 
data and analytics capabilities to support Apple’s product such as iPad and iPhone to improve 
product efficiency and consumer experiences. This would allow both Apple and IBM to achieve 
new levels of efficiency, effectiveness, and consumer satisfaction. Buyer-supplier collaboration 
not only yields benefit for partners, but also creates future and unforeseen opportunities. It is not 
just the exchange such as information or resources but creating new value for the relationship. 
Buyer-supplier collaboration can derive various critical resources such as funds, time, and 
proprietary knowledge for partners (Moros and Corsten, 2015). In the meantime, the power 
shared by the partners can capture the market share and business criticality that build a higher 
level of trust and satisfaction (Moros and Corsten, 2015). All those factors are the determinants 
of firms’ survival and success and the key factors to impact their competitive advantage.  
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 Several studies have shown that buyer-supplier collaboration can be promoted by either 
“hard factors” or “soft factors”. Jap (2001) provides the evidence that resource sharing can 
determine the quality of the relationship such as satisfaction with the collaboration or willingness 
to collaborate in the future. Fawcett et al. (2007) indicate that information sharing is the factor 
that can increase collaboration among supply chain members. Further, Blomqvist et al. (2005) 
explore the impact of contract on collaboration between firms. They find that it is costly to have 
the full contract and contract itself cannot guarantee successful collaboration. However, the 
process of building the contract can make both firms understand each other’s goals and 
perspectives which would build collaboration. Lastly, Nyaga et al. (2013) find that non-mediated 
power is the source for collaboration between buyers and suppliers.  
Overall, resource sharing, information sharing, contracts, and power are the hard factors 
that can determine the level of collaboration, and there are also soft factors that can impact 
collaboration. Luzzini et al. (2015) report that commitment can increase both intra-firm and 
inter-firm collaboration. Similarly, Hofer et al. (2012) show that trust can increase collaboration 
due to the reduction of relationship uncertainty. Chatman and Barsade (1998) identify the impact 
of culture differences on collaboration. They find that cooperative employees in collectivistic 
cultures are more likely to collaborate with their coworkers; they report working with the 
greatest number of people, and they prefer evaluating their work performance by team 
contribution rather than individual achievement.  
 While collaboration can be influenced by hard or soft factors, it is tough to make it work 
than companies imagine (Liker and Choi, 2004). Building collaboration requires a lot of efforts. 
Japanese companies have been successfully built collaboration such as Toyota, but many 
American companies do not successfully collaborate with their partners for the past 20 years 
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(Liker and Choi, 2004). Collaboration is costly to implement—they require extra 
communication, coordination, and risk sharing (Lambert and Knemeyer, 2004). Further, 
collaboration sometimes has a negative impact on the buyer-supplier relationships even during 
periods of growth or stability. It is inevitable to influence certain level of functional conflicts 
such as differing viewpoints or dysfunctional conflicts such as dissatisfied partner’s performance 
(Kozan et al., 2006). Partners become increasing dissatisfied as the relationship persists (Grayson 
and Amler, 1999). Similarly, Ephross and Vassil (1993) point out that annoying issues and 
conflicts are raising when two parties work closely with each other. In addition, collaboration is 
built with the expectation of benefits accruing to both parties which fuel the long-term 
relationship and make the parties stick together. However, it also nurtures the growth of 
opportunistic behaviors that is self-interest seeking with guile for the short-run benefits. This 
indicates that collaboration that is motivated by economic incentives (i.e. mutual benefits) is 
vulnerable to the benefits that they can earn through taking advantage of their partners in a short 
period (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
 No matter to use resource sharing or power as hard factors or to build trust or 
commitment as soft factors to promote collaboration, collaboration is built either on exchange or 
benefits. As I discuss above, the relationship is vulnerable due to the negative impact of 
economic incentives. There is a “hidden cost of reward” (Frey, 1997). Frey and Jegen (2001) 
find that monetary incentives or punishments can crowd-out intrinsic motivation because 
individuals perceive themselves to be controlled by their partners. In this case, both self-
determination and self-esteem suffer, and they react by reducing their intrinsic motivation in the 
activity controlled. Furthermore, researchers find that when the external reward vanished or 
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stable, they are more likely to exhibit deception (Gneezy, 2005), dishonesty (Mazar et al., 2008), 
or opportunism (John, 1984).  
 The economic and psychology literature has identified social preferences as an alternative 
to monetary incentives to motivate individual behaviors (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Loch and 
Wu, 2008; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen 2011). Social preference is the intrinsic drive that 
individuals are not considering by self-interest, but concerning for their partner’s welfare, 
reciprocating a history of a positive relationship with their partners, or intrinsic desires for a 
higher relative payoff for the group (Loch and Wu, 2008). Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) argue 
that social preferences can help understand competition, cooperation, collective action, material 
incentives, and important forces shaping social norms and market failures. Charness and Rabin 
(2002) find that social preference makes subjects more willing to sacrifice their benefits to 
increase the social welfare which means increasing the payoff for the low recipients. They also 
indicate that subjects are more concerned about the fairness among each other.   
 In supply chain literature, the assumption for the decision maker is that they are self-
interested and rational. The goal of decision making is to maximize their own profits or benefits 
(Loch and Wu, 2008). Without considering such as emotion, reciprocity, status, or identity, it is 
not possible to adequately understand individuals’ behaviors and decisions (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2002). Further, social preferences may mitigate the negative impact of self-interest 
for supply chain partners and increase the channel efficiency (Cui et al. 2007). Identity is 
proposed as a pro-social factor that can trigger trust and trustworthiness (Williams, 2001), 
effective resource sharing (Goette et al., 2006), and increased motivation (Camerer and 
Malmendier, 2007). Identity and relationships are interlinked, but identity has not fully 
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considered in supply chain literature. There have been calls for the behavioral operations 
researchers to investigate the role of identity in operational settings (Loch and Wu, 2005).  
Identity includes two types: natural identity such as ethnicity (Chen et al., 2014) and 
gender (Solow and Kirkwood, 2002) and induced identity such as organizational identity (Mael 
and Ashforth, 1992) or group identity (Chen and Li, 2009). Therefore, the aim of the dissertation 
lies in investigating and obtaining a broader understanding of the impact of identity on buyer-
supplier collaboration and performance considering two types of identity—buyer-supplier 
identification and gender identity. Two individual studies implementing controlled lab 
experiments are proposed to examine the impact of buyer-supplier identification and gender 
identity on collaboration and performance in a buyer-supplier relationship context. Figure 1 
illustrates the relationship between two essays. Using social identity theory, the following 
research questions will be addressed in this dissertation: 
(1) Does buyer-supplier identification increase collaboration and performance? 
(2) How does buyer-supplier identification form? 
(3) Does gender identity increase collaboration and performance in a buyer-supplier 
relationship? 





Figure 1: Dissertation Overview 
Theoretical Background 
Social Identity Theory 
 Tajfel (1972) introduces the idea of social identity to theorize how people conceptualize 
themselves in an intergroup context, and how a system of social categorizations “creates and 
defines an individual’s own place in society” (p. 293). He defined social identity as “the 
individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional 
and value significance to him of this group membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p. 292). A group can be 
formed by the common definition of individuals such as gender or ethnicity, emotional 
involvement such as people suffered from the same problem, or daily interactions such as 
working in the same team (Tajel, 1974; Postmes et al., 2005). Tajfel (1974) conceptualized group 
in a broad way—a collection of individuals perceived themselves belonging to a social category. 
A group can be an organization such that an employee working in an organization perceives 
other employees in the same organization as “in-group” members. A group can be a team such 
that an employee working in a marketing team perceives other employees in the same team as 
the “in-group” members and employees in different teams (even though in the same 










 Individuals have the perception of in-group and out-group when the group forms. The 
comparison of in-group and out-group triggers the positive feelings toward in-group members 
and negative evaluations toward the out-group members (Turner 1975). For example, Abrams 
and Hogg (1988) find that individuals show solidarity within group members and discrimination 
against out-group members. Tanis and Postmes (2005) find that individuals trust in-group 
members more than out-group members. Furthermore, individuals are more likely to exhibit the 
reciprocal behaviors toward the in-group members compared to the out-group members (Kramer 
and Brewer, 1984). 
Social identity theory (SIT) assumes that we show all kinds of “in-group” favoritism 
behaviors and “out-group” discrimination due to the group identity formed by individuals in 
various social groups. Group identity is not only making individuals perceive/feel belonging to 
the group, but also generating cognitive, evaluative, and emotional components (Tajfel, 1979). 
For example, an individual knows that he is the member of a fitness club (cognitive component), 
and he evaluates this membership positively (evaluative component), and he feels proud of his 
membership (emotional component). Therefore, SIT postulates that there are four steps to form 
group identity: social categorization, social comparison, social identity, and self-esteem (Tajfel, 
1979).  
 Social categorization. People tend to categorize others into groups to simplify their 
understanding of the world and to structure social interactions (Trepte, 2006). Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) summarize that “social categorizations are conceived here as cognitive tools that segment, 
classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake many 
forms of social action…They create and define the individual’s place in society” (p. 40). People 
categorize themselves and other people into various groups. For example, a Chinese lady who 
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has a 3-year old boy works at CXY Company. She can categorize herself into different groups 
such as a female group, a Chinese association, a mom’s club, or a member of CXY Company. 
However, even though she belongs to different groups, she may not be aware of them at the same 
time or evaluate them as the same importance at the same time (Tajfel, 1979).  Group 
membership can be salient in certain circumstance to initiate behaviors. Thus, social 
categorization can help interpret, explain, and even justify people’s behaviors (Turner 1982). 
 Social comparison. The first type of behaviors that is triggered by social categorization is 
the social comparison (Trepte, 2006). People evaluate themselves and their “salient” group 
membership in comparison with other groups that share similarity and proximity with them 
(Hinkle and Brown, 1990). SIT assumes that people evaluate social groups to which they belong, 
and others belong to through social comparison. 
 Social identity.  SIT suggests that social identity is based on more or less favorable 
comparisons between the in-group and a relevant out-group (Tajfel, 1979). By differentiating 
between in-group from out-group, people generate a positive attitude toward their in-group 
members and relatively positive social identity in comparison to out-group. They further identify 
with the group that they belong to. 
 Self-esteem. SIT argues that the positive social identity generated from the “in-group” is 
the fundamental individual motivation for self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This idea 
strives to confirm aspects of their self-definition. SIT suggests that positive evaluation of one’s 
own group membership satisfy individuals’ need for their positive self-esteem (Turner et al., 
1979). Social identity provides the distinctiveness among individuals and can enhance self-
esteem through the positive evaluation of the membership. This can explain why people exhibit 
in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.  
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The Difference Between Identity and Identification 
 The terminologies used in various disciplines about identity are different. In management 
and psychology literature, scholars use “organization” as the entity to represent “social groups”. 
Therefore, they define organizational identity as the central, enduring, and distinctive about an 
organization's character (Gioia, et al., 2000). There are three different forms of connection 
between the employee and an organization: identification, disidentification, and ambivalent 
identification (Anand et al., 2012). Organizational identification is defined as perceived oneness 
with an organization and the experience of the organization's successes and failures as one's own 
(Mael and Ashforth, 1992). It is the perception of belonging to the organization, and they treat 
themselves as part of the organization. His/her own identity has a strong overlap with the 
organizational identity (Dutton et al., 1994). Through identification, he/she perceives him or 
herself as psychologically intertwined with the fate of the organization, as sharing a common 
destiny and experiencing its success and failures (Tolman, 1943; Mael and Ashforth, 1992).  
 Organizational identification examines the connections between the individual and the 
organization and defines who you are (Mael and Ashforth, 1992). Organizational 
disidentification defines a sense of separateness and answers the question who you are not 
(Elsbach and Bhattacharya, 2002). People are reluctant to portray themselves as too distinctive or 
too indistinctive. Steele et al. (2002) find that people distanced themselves from positively 
distinct categorizations that carried with them unwanted stereotypes such as in the casino or 
tobacco companies. They are afraid that the negative image of the company impacts their own 
identity. For example, Lai, Chan, and Lam (2012) provide evidence by examining employees’ 
identity in casino dealers that if the employees perceive their work to be morally dirty, they 
disidentify with the organization (the casino dealer).  
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 After the good—organizational identification and the bad—organizational 
disidentification, there is a third type: ambivalent identification. Organizations are complex and 
equivocal. They, sometimes, do not define their values, goals, and beliefs clearly. Therefore, 
individuals can simultaneously identify and disidentify with the organization. This is called 
ambivalent identification. For example, an employee may identify with his organization for 
certain aspects—I identify with my company to become more sustainable and environmental 
friendly. He may simultaneously disidentify with the organization’s other aspects—I disidentify 
with my company to be a cost-saving oriented firm.  
However, in the experimental economics literature, scholars have used different 
terminologies to capture identification and disidentification. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is the 
first to introduce identity to the economic analysis. Identity, according to Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), refers to a person’s sense of self. Chen and Li (2009) defines social identity as a person’s 
sense of self-derived from perceived membership in social groups. When the economic scholars 
refer to the social groups, the entity is broader than the organization. Social groups can be the 
working teams within the organization, the organization, or the relationship between 
organizations. Once a person identifies with a group which means she perceived herself as part 
of a group, she derives self-esteem from that group membership and adopts behaviors that are 
consistent with the stereotypes associated with the group identity (Chen and Li, 2009). Hence, 
she treats other members in the same group as “in-group” (Chen and Li, 2009) and members of 
different groups as “out-group”. The focus of in-group and out-group is between individuals in 
the same/different groups.  
The difference of the terminologies between management literature and behavioral 
economics literature is that organizational identification emphasizes on the individual identified 
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with the organization. However, in-group concept focuses on the individual perceived him or 
herself and the other individuals belonging to the same organization. An individual can identify 
with an organization and treat other individuals in the same organization as in-group members. 
 The terminology used in this dissertation is buyer-supplier identification in Essay 1. It is 
a perceptual and cognitive construct that refers to an individual’s cognitive evaluation of the 
overlap between his/her own identity and the identity of an organization (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989). Buyer-supplier identification is defined as perceived oneness of a supplier/buyer (the 
individual) with its partner's organization and the experience of its partner’s successes and 
failures as its own in the buyer-supplier relationships (Mael and Ashforth, 1989).  
This definition is distinct from organizational identification. Organizational identification 
emphasizes that individuals only identify with their own organization that they are working for, 
but the buyer-supplier identification focuses on the perspective that they also identified with their 
partner’s organization. For example, if a person who is an employee from Proctor and Gamble, 
he may generate the organizational identification with Proctor and Gamble by working for the 
company. He may treat himself as part of the Proctor and Gamble family. In addition, if he 
works in the dedicated team of Proctor and Gamble that only deals with Costco’s business, he 
may involve in many interactions with Costco’s employees. Therefore, he may also generate the 
identity with Costco which is not the company that he is working for, but his partner’s company 
that he is working with. The identification with Costco developed through the business 
interactions is called buyer-supplier identification. This buyer-supplier identification is dyadic 




Why Identity and Identification Matter 
 Identity and identification are inter-correlated with each other. Haslam and Ellemers 
(2005) explain that to identify with an organization which generates organizational identification, 
one must have an identity that is overlapped with organization’s identity. Identity and 
identification can change not only individuals’ perceptions and behaviors but also organizational 
outcomes.  
 Previous literature in psychology has shown that identity can motivate self-enhancement. 
According to SIT, the basic motive for identifying with a group/organization is to increase self-
esteem (Ashforth et al., 2008). People identify with an organization/group to provide the basis of 
thinking of themselves in a positive light (Ashforth et al., 2008). For example, a person who 
graduated from a high prestige school may identify with the school. She may think the prestige 
associated with the school is reflected onto her as an alumnus (Cialdini et al., 1976) and think 
more highly of herself because of it.   
 In addition, behavioral economics literature has examined that identity/identification can 
alter individuals’ behaviors. Chakravarty and Fonseca (2016) find that subjects exhibit in-group 
reciprocity and cooperation as well as display their preferences for in-group interactions. Kelly 
and Presslee (2016) explore group identity in the tournament context. They find that stronger 
group identity makes the individuals concern more about other people’s payoffs in the same 
group and willing to make a personal sacrifice to benefits others in the same group. Therefore, 
the competitiveness between the in-group members is decreasing, so as the performance. These 
findings provide important messages to the managers that group identity can change individuals’ 
behaviors and they have to consider it when making people work together.  
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 Identity and identification are attractive to scholars partly because they can also increase 
organizational outcomes due to its social nature. Kramer (2006) finds that social identity can 
promote collaboration in workplace and Simon (1976) reports social identity can benefit 
organizational decision making. Further, identity can trigger intrinsic motivation for better task 
performance (van Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore, “individuals understand, accept, and employ 
organizational premises in their decision making and other actions, in effect becoming a 
microcosm of the organization such that acting on behalf of the organization is tantamount to 
acting on behalf of themselves” (Ashforth et al., 2008, p.337).  
Foundational Literature Review 
 According to SIT, people can classify themselves and other people into various 
categories, and different individuals may utilize different categorization schemes (Mael and 
Ashforth, 1989). SIT assumes that “the self-concept is comprised of a personal identity 
encompassing idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g., bodily attributes, abilities, psychological traits, 
interests) and a social identity encompassing salient group classifications” (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989, p. 21). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is consistent with this classification and model identity 
into a natural identity that focuses on personal traits such as gender or ethnicity and induced 
group identity with salient group classifications. The two Essays in this dissertation will address 
these two types of identity and investigate how induced group identity and natural identity 
influence buyer-supplier collaboration and performance.  
Induced Group Identity---Buyer-supplier Identification 
 Previous literature has documented that induced group identity can impact individuals’ 
behaviors. Chen and Li (2009) present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of 
	
 15 
induced group identity on social preference. They find that when participants are matched with 
an in-group member, they show an increased concern in charity and a decrease in envy. 
Individuals are more likely to reward their in-group members for good behaviors, and less likely 
to punish bad behaviors coming from the in-group members. Further, if individuals generate the 
in-group membership, they are more willing to choose the behaviors that can maximize the 
social welfare rather than only focus on their self-interests. Similarly, Chen and Chen (2011) 
explore the effect of induced social identity on equilibrium selection. They find that participants 
in the in-group sessions choose significantly higher effort levels than those in the control and 
out-group sessions, while participants in the control and out-group sessions do not choose 
significantly different effort levels in the enhanced sessions. When they perceived more 
significant salient on group membership, participants in the in-group sessions choose 
significantly higher effort levels. Moreover, Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) implement a 
trust game and provide evidence that individuals trust their in-group members more than 
outgroup members because of the discrimination of the outsider. They also find that group 
membership can provide psychological benefits, but these psychological values can introduce 
social inertia. Charness et al. (2007) find that compared to isolated individuals, salient group 
membership significantly increases the aggressive stance of the hosts and tends to reduce that of 
the guests. Further, the in-group membership can significantly increase non-selfish cooperation 
in prisoner’s dilemma game (Goette et al., wp).  
 In management and psychology literature, scholars have reported the impact of identity in 
various settings. Tavares et al. (2015) suggest that organizational identification plays a 
moderating role between perceived organizational support and employees’ turnover and extra-
role behaviors by using the data from a large Portuguese private financial services’ firm. They 
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find that when employees have high organizational identification, they are less likely to leave the 
organization if they perceive to receive the organizational support and more likely to exhibit 
extra-role behaviors. Zavyalova et al. (2016) examine the organizational identification in a 
negative context. They suggest that if a negative event happened to the high-reputation firm, the 
low identification stakeholders are less likely to support the organization.  
 In the operations literature, to our knowledge, there are only two papers that explore the 
effect of identity in the operations management context. Corsten et al. (2011) use a similar 
terminology—supplier-to-buyer identification which only examines the fact that only suppliers 
identify with retailers in the firm level. They find that supplier-to-buyer identification leads to 
higher trust, information exchange, and innovation through a survey research with perceptual 
measurements. Papier et al. (working paper) bring the concept of group identity between teams 
within a firm into supply chain forecasting and ordering context. They find that group identity 
increased demand planners’ effort investment which also increases the whole supply chain 
performance.  
Natural Identity 
 In comparison to induced group identity, natural identity is another type of identity that 
can influence individuals’ behaviors. Natural identity includes gender and ethnicity (Papier, et 
al., wp), but in this dissertation, Essay II only focuses on gender identity.  
 Previous literature has shown that females and males are different regarding risk 
preference, social preference, and competition. For example, Byrnes et al. (1999) compared male 
and female’s risk-taking tendencies by conducting a meta-analysis of 150 studies. They find that 
females behave/perceive differently than males in certain topics such as intellectual risk taking 
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and physical skills compared to smoking. These differences are particularly pronounced when it 
comes to physical or life-threatening risks (Hersch, 1997). In addition, gender differences in risk 
propensity have been observed in another context such as financial decision-making or 
investment decisions.  
 Experimental economics have also explored the gender difference in various games. 
Solow and Kirkwood (2002) provide evidence that gender has a significant impact on the 
contribution of public goods. They find that males contribute more than females. On the 
contrary, Gneezy et al. (2003) find that women are more likely to collaborate with the group 
members to increase the group efficiency, but males are more likely to work individually. When 
there is a third-party involved, females are more likely to collaborate if the other female observes 
her behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game (Charness and Rustichini, 2011). There are several 
studies that examine competitive behaviors between men and women. The findings are 
consistent across studies that males are more likely to involve in a competitive environment, but 
females are more likely to choose team-work environment (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2004; Datta Gupta et al., 2005). Croson and Gneezy (2008) review the literature of 
gender difference and provide the following explanations that can reveal the reasons for gender 
differences. They argue that women hold strong emotions compared to men and when they 
experience risky choices, their emotion exhibits dominant, and the utility of choice would 
decrease. Also, men are overconfident about their success, and therefore, they are more likely to 
make risky decisions. Further, women and men have different views toward risk. Males treat risk 
as a challenge, but females think it is a threat. All these reasons can explain why females are 
more risk averse than male. In addition, females are more context-driven, and they make 
decisions and exhibit behaviors according to the situation. However, males are more context-
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neutral, and their decisions and behaviors are more consistent across context. These reasons can 
explain why females are more inequity averse, reciprocity, and less competitive.  
Structure of The Dissertation 
 To address the four research questions outlined in the introduction, two individual Essays 
are proposed. Essay 1 follows the stream of induced group identity and is trying to understand 
the impact of buyer-supplier identification which refers to perceived oneness of a supplier/buyer 
with its partner’s organization and the experience so its partner’s successes and failures as its 
own (Ashforth and Mael, 1989) on supply chain discretionary collaboration and performance. 
Essay 2 investigates another stream of identity—gender identity. It is examining the influence of 
gender composition on trust, trustworthiness, collaboration, and performance in buyer-supplier 
relationships.  
Essay 1 
 The aim of this essay is to explore how buyer-supplier identification impacts supply 
chain collaboration and performance. Also, it is trying to understand the formation and 
foundation of buyer-supplier identification. Using social identity theory, a conceptual framework 
is developed with the hypotheses. To test the hypotheses, I conduct a controlled laboratory 
experiment by using different ways to manipulate buyer-supplier identification. Consistent with 
the literature, this Essay uses minimum group paradigm and problem-solving task to create group 
identity between buyers and suppliers. I also mimic the collocation phenomenon in the 
experiment to examine whether physical collocation is an efficient method to enhance buyer-
supplier identification and understand the reason that collocation exists between buyers and 
suppliers in practice. 
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 Controlled laboratory experiment provides several benefits to this study. First, it can 
present the causal effect of independent variables (buyer-supplier identification) on the 
dependent variables of interest (collaboration and performance) (Tokar, 2010). For the identity 
research, there exist various causal links between constructs. For example, Mael and Ashforth 
(1992) propose that inter-organizational competition can enhance organizational identification, 
but intra-organizational competition can reduce the organizational identification. This evidence 
shows that competition/collaboration can also impact identity. To avoid endogeneity problem, a 
controlled laboratory experiment is a more appropriate method to test the causal relationship. 
Second, to ensure that only the variables of interested are manipulated and to rule out potential 
confounds, this study has the careful development of experimental manipulations (Perdue and 
Summers, 1986; Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011). 
 This study has four treatment groups with increased levels of buyer-supplier 
identification from minimum group paradigm which is using the minimal way to create buyer-
supplier identification, to the problem-solving which includes online and face-to-face problem-
solving task to enhance buyer-supplier identification, to collocation that is the most advanced 
way to further enhance buyer-supplier identification. A control group serves as the baseline. The 
experimental task implemented in this study is a forecasting and production game that a subject 
plays a role of a retailer that forecasts for the future customer demand according to his/her 
private forecast information. Then he/she makes a forecast report submit to his/her partner--a 
supplier-- the role is played by another paired subject. Suppliers need to choose a production 
plan according to the forecast report that the retailer gives to him. Finally, the demand will be 
realized and profit obtained for both suppliers and retailers. This game is adapted from Ozer et 




 Essay two focuses on the impact of gender composition on collaboration, and 
performance in buyer-supplier relationships. This Essay is also trying to understand the 
difference between trust and trustworthiness between females and males. Previous literature has 
extensively explored the gender difference in various aspects, but there is a lack of research on 
gender composition especially when gender identity is salient. This Essay is trying to advance 
our understanding on whether the heterogeneous team will outperform compared to the 
homogeneous team and in which level team member trusts their partners.  
 A controlled laboratory experiment is conducted to answer the research questions. 
Consistent with Essay 1, Essay 2 uses the same forecasting and production game. 
Contributions and Implications 
Contributions and Implications of Essay 1 
This research contributes to supply chain management literature in three ways. First, it 
develops and introduces a new terminology into supply chain management literature. To our 
knowledge, there is only two research in operations management literature that explores the role 
of identity. Papier et al. (wp) focus on the group identity between demand planner and 
production planner who identified with each other in the intra-organizational level. Corsten et al. 
(2012) examine the influence of identity in the inter-organizational level that a supplier firm 
identified with a retailer firm. Those two studies are either in the intra-organizational level or the 
inter-organizational level. However, the buyer-supplier relationship is dyadic and individual 
managers purchase the product and produce the product. Thus, our definition well-captured this 
phenomenon and explores the effect of buyer-supplier identification between individuals.  
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Second, we propose buyer-supplier identification is a non-economic method to trigger 
discretionary collaboration. It enables firms to be more willing to collaborate and sacrifice their 
own profits to benefit both their peers and the supply chain. This would avoid the problem of 
incomplete contract and the negative impact of monetary incentives. 
 Third, this research is the first to employ a controlled laboratory experiment to explore 
the formation and foundation of buyer-supplier identification. It sticks with the previous 
experimental economics literature and psychology literature that minimum paradigm is efficient 
enough to form identity and shared experience can enhance identity. However, this research also 
mimics the real-world phenomenon—collocation—to test whether collocation can create 
stronger identification between employees in a supplier company and the retailer’s company or 
vice versa. This helps us to understand the behavioral benefits of collocation beyond the 
operational benefits.  
 This study also offers managerial implications for practitioners. First, it explains the 
behavioral benefits of collocation. Even though collocation is expensive for the suppliers, but 
suppliers, in fact, benefits more from the identification generated through collocation. Therefore, 
beyond operational benefits such as more information sharing and faster decision-making 
process, collocation can also bring behavioral benefit—buyer-supplier identification.  
 Second, collocation is one of the most efficient ways to create strong buyer-supplier 
identity. It encourages retailers and suppliers work closely with each other. If suppliers are 





Contributions and Implications of Essay 2 
 Essay two offers two-fold contributions to supply chain management literature. First, this 
study is the first to explore gender composition between suppliers and retailers in the literature. It 
treats employees in the buyer-supplier relationships as the team. Gender is the existing identity 
for individuals, by exploring the effect of natural identity, the results can easily apply to the real-
world settings. Previous literature has documented various methods to promote collaboration 
from the contract, to monetary incentives, to non-economic factors, but this study is from a 
natural identity perspective to promote collaboration from the similarity/difference among the 
group members. Second, by understanding gender differences in trust and trustworthiness 
between different gender composition of suppliers and retailers, this Essay can conclude that 
whether individuals do not exhibit collaborative behavior not because they are not willing to, but 
because they don’t believe their partner has the ability to complete the work. 
 In addition, this study will offer several implications to managers. First, when forming 
working relationships, managers may want to consider the gender of the employees in their 
partner’s company to make the relationship more efficient and effective. Second, if the gender 
composition in the relationship is not ideal, he/she may consider not to make the gender identity 
of salient in the working environment. Third, gender composition provides a non-economic 
perspective to managers to encourage collaboration and better team performance.  
Dissertation Outline 
 Following the introduction in chapter one, chapter two focuses on how buyer-supplier 
identification impacts supply chain collaboration and performance. Next chapter three constitutes 
the second type of identity—gender identity. It explores the influence of gender composition on 
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supply chain collaboration and performance and also whether females exhibit difference in trust 
and trustworthiness compared to males. Lastly, chapter four will conclude this dissertation by 
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II. ESSAY 1 
 







 “Toyota helped us dramatically improve our production system. We started by making 
one component, and as we improved, [Toyota] rewarded us with orders for more 
components. Toyota is our best customer.” —Senior executive, supplier to Ford, GM, 
Chrysler, and Toyota, July 2001 (Liker and Choi, 2004) 
 
Sociologists, social psychologists, and organizational theorists have long recognized the 
importance of collaboration within groups and organizations (Fine and Holyfield, 1996; 
Hackman, 2002; Turner, 2014; Kremer, 2006). With more than 50 percent of manufacturers’ 
revenues spend in their supply chains (Tarabori, 2011), research in operations management has 
also emphasized the value of buyer-supplier collaboration over the past two decades. The 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationship can be viewed as firms’ competitive advantage (Carr 
and Pearson, 1999; Ellram, 1991; Krause, 1999) which benefits both supplier and buyers (Lyons 
et al., 1990). Collaboration can reduce manufacturing and labor costs, improve quality, and 
increase R&D effectiveness (Lyons et al., 1990). For example, Starbucks partnered with Barns 
and Nobles bookstores to provide in-house coffee shops, benefiting both themselves and 
retailers. Howlett-Packard and Disney have a long-standing alliance that HP’s IT architecture 
and engineers support Disney’s virtual attraction system—SPACE to create Disney’s most 
technologically advanced attractions. Collaboration becomes one of the most important factors 
that determines firms’ success in the nowadays competitive world.  
 Recognizing its importance and benefits, scholars in various disciplines have afforded 
considerable attention to identify the foundations or bases of collaboration. Corsten and Kumar 
(2005) find that trust between manufacturers and retailers can promote supplier’s capability 
development which results in collaboration with the focal retailer. Simonin (1997) suggests that 





benefit of collaboration. Hofer et al. (2012) provide evidence that both trust and commitment can 
improve cooperation in the logistics outsourcing relationships.  
Three theories—transaction cost economics, resource dependence theory, and social 
exchange theory-- provided particular interests in explaining the antecedences of collaboration. 
Traditional economics assumes that people are self-interested and rational agents (Williamson, 
1989). Resource dependence theory and social exchange theory propose that collaboration is 
built on either resource exchange, or common goals, or mutual benefits. In the decentralized 
supply chain, both suppliers and retailers have incentives to adhere to their own goals to 
maximize their profits rather than concerning the supply chain performance as a whole.  
To align the goals of different echelons in the supply chain, the contract is one way to 
achieve efficiency (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2002) provide 
the evidence that the supply chain contract can make the independent supply chain partners work 
coherently among each other in the decentralized setting as if the supply chain operates in a 
centralized setting. Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) report that the quality flexible contract can improve 
the supply chain performance by dampening the order variability and reducing the “bullwhip” 
effect. Monetary incentives also play a significant role to achieve supply chain efficiency 
(Cachon, 2003).  
The contract is often an inevitable element of transactional relationships, but Maloni and 
Benton (2000) argue that using the contract to govern the relationship is not in the best interest of 
the involved parties. The contract is incomplete in most cases, and it is costly to develop a formal 
and complete contract. Tsay (1999) examines the decentralized supply chain coordinating with 





efficiency and that inefficiency leads to retailer’s over-forecasting or simply making decisions 
based on local information rather than global perspective.  
Other than contract, Pisano and Verganti (2009) suggest that monetary incentives can 
attract external collaborators, but monetary incentives have negative behavioral consequences 
such as crowding out intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2000), deception (Gneezy, 2005), 
dishonesty (Mazar et al., 2008), or decreasing trust (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). Due to 
incomplete contracts and problems of monetary incentives, the efficiency of an organization 
heavily depends on individuals’ willingness to take non-selfish actions, such as cooperating 
when there is no incentive to do so or punishing inefficient actions by others. Therefore, it is 
necessary to move away from traditional and formal contracts or monetary incentives but to 
emphasize more on informal factors that can motivate voluntary behaviors. 
 The economics literature has identified social preference as a non-economic perspective 
to replace monetary incentives to change individual behaviors. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
suggest that simply being able to identify with a group is an important source of individual well-
being. Smith (1975) argues in a similar fashion that people enjoy the “special pleasure of mutual 
sympathy” that comes from belonging to a group. A group membership matters for individuals in 
the sense that it can affect their behaviors which have been shown in experimental economics 
literature in various types of games. Charness et al. (2007) and Goette et al. (2006) provide the 
evidence that group identity can impact individual behaviors in the prisoner’s dilemma game. 
Tan and Bolle (2007) suggest that group identity can increase subjects’ contributions and 
decrease their free-riding behaviors in the public goods game. Hargreaves and Varoufakis (2002) 
and Binmore et al. (1985) find that group identity plays a significant role in bargaining settings. 





settings. Therefore, the current study experimentally investigates how buyer-supplier 
identification as one type of social preference influences discretionary collaboration and supply 
chain performance.  
 Buyer-supplier identification refers to the perceived oneness of a supplier/buyer with its 
partner’s organization and experience of its partner’s successes and failures as its own (Ashforth 
and Mael, 1989). The basic assumptions of TCE, RDT, and SET focused on either taking actions 
to reduce transaction cost or interacting with others to gain desired material resources. However, 
according to those theories, motivations already outlined which lead people to seek to minimize 
their own cost or maximize the resources gained by their organizations (Tyler, 1999). Different 
from TCE, RV, and SET, buyer-supplier identification reflects the antecedents of discretionary 
behavior—that is, the behavior that occurs without a direct connection to rewards or costs. 
Cooperative behaviors are especially valuable when they occur voluntarily, with people acting 
based on their internal values, rather than upon judgments of potential gains or losses. Such 
voluntary cooperative behaviors occur without the use of organizational resources for their 
implementation because the motivation for those behaviors comes from people’s internal 
values—that is, from what people want to do or feel they ought to do.  
 The purpose of this study is to advance the understanding of the role of buyer-supplier 
identification in operations management context. This study offers several contributions to 
supply chain management literature and operations management literature. First, it develops and 
introduces buyer-supplier identification, the individual level construct, to operations 
management literature. Management literature has used the similar construct—organizational 
identification. However, this construct only focuses on the employee that identified with his/her 





identification. They focus on the inter-organizational relationship that a supplier (firm) identified 
with a retailer (firm). However, the construct in this paper, buyer-supplier identification, is the 
individual-level construct that emphasizes on the employee who works for a supplier/retailer that 
perceives oneness with the retailer’s firm. Second, it proposes buyer-supplier identification as an 
alternative motivation to monetary incentives to promote discretionary collaboration and supply 
chain performance. I intend to advance the understanding that whether buyer-supplier 
identification can trigger altruistical behaviors that either the supplier/retailer (individuals who 
work for the supplier/retailer firm) are willing to sacrifice their own interests to benefit their 
partner and the whole supply chain. Third, to my knowledge, this is the first research to 
implement a controlled laboratory experiment to explore the effect of buyer-supplier 
identification on discretionary collaboration and supply chain performance to build the causal 
link of the antecedence of collaboration and performance in operations management literature. In 
addition, this experiment advanced the understanding of the formation and foundation of buyer-
supplier identification. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I use social identity 
theory to explain how buyer-supplier identification forms. Next, a section with theoretical 
justifications for the hypothesized relationships is presented. Following the hypotheses, I present 
the details of the controlled laboratory experiment and results. In the last section, I discuss the 
conclusions and implications of this research. 
Literature Review 
According to social identity theory, particularly in management literature, organizational 
identification describes an individual’s perception of belongingness or oneness with a particular 





(Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Mael and Ashforth, 1992). Social identity theorists have argued that 
organizational identification has formed in three steps: first, people classify themselves and other 
people into various social categories such as organizational membership, religious affiliation, 
gender group, or age cohort (Tajfel and Turner, 1985). Individuals can belong to various 
categories, and people may utilize different categorization schemes when they put themselves 
and other people into groups (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).  
 Second, individuals can use social classification to locate or define themselves in the 
social environment by using a personal identity encompassing idiosyncratic characteristics (for 
example, bodily attributes, abilities, psychological traits, interests) and a social identity 
encompassing salience group classification (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). For example, a woman 
who has a kid perceives herself belonging to a female group, and also a member of Mom’s club.  
 Third, people compare the group they belong to with similar groups that they do not 
involve in. This in-group and out-group comparison enables the selection and evaluation of the 
relevant relational attributes (Tajfel, 1972). As indicated before, individuals have multiple group 
identities, but not all the group memberships are salient at the same time. Group identity is 
salient in certain situations to certain individuals (Tajfel, 1959).  Morland (1969) find that 
individuals in the United States are more sensitive to skin color than those in Hong Kong. Giles 
and Powesland (1976) report that individuals in French, Canada, Wales, and Belgium are more 
sensitive to lauguages and use languages to classify themselves and others into various groups.  
 Group formation and group identity generation can create the in-group and out-group 
comparison. However, it does not indicate that in-group members compare themselves with 





relevant and proximate to them (Tajfel, 1972). This comparison creates a favorable bias toward 
the group to which they belong (Chen and Li 2009). 
 Tajfel (1982) states that the final stage to achieve identification is that individuals should 
have the frequent connection with the group, be aware of the membership of the group, and 
evaluate the membership of the group.  
 Social identity theory was developed to understand the psychological basis for intergroup 
bias and discrimination (Chen and Li, 2009). Previous literature has found that social identity 
impacts individual behaviors. Social identity has been linked to in-group favoring actions, 
collective actions, monetary donation, and loyalty. For example, Brewer (1979) reviews the 
experimental research in psychology literature on intergroup discrimination in favor of one’s 
own group. Results suggest that intergroup competition and status differentials can affect the 
salience of distinctions between in-group and out-group. These differences create the in-group 
bias. Further, the enhancement of in-group bias is more related to the increased favoritism 
toward in-group members than to increased hostility toward out-group members. Blader (2007) 
conducts a survey research and finds that individuals develop higher level of identification with 
the specific union-organizing group compared to those who identified with cohort group. Also, 
this identification with union-organizing group has a stronger impact on individual positions 
regarding union certification. In terms of monetary donations, Mael and Ashforth (1992) suggest 
that the group identification with the alma mater can increase individuals’ hypothetical outcomes 
of making financial contributions, willingness to advise one’s offspring or others to attend to 
college, and participating in various school functions.  
 Experimental economics literature has similar findings. Chen and Chen (2011) explore 





different levels of group identity and find that when group identity is in the low level, 
participants do not choose significantly different effort levels among in-group, out-group, and 
control group treatments. However, with the increased level of group identity, participants in the 
in-group sessions choose significantly higher effort levels than those in the control and out-group 
sessions, while participants in the control and out-group sessions do not choose significantly 
different effort levels. Therefore, the salience of group identity can increase individuals’ effort 
levels toward their in-group members. Chen and Li (2009) find that subjects have more charity 
concerns and less envy toward their in-group members. In the meantime, they are less likely to 
punish their in-group members who have bad behaviors. Bernhard et al. (2006) explore the social 
identity with the third-party presence in the dictator game. They find a much higher willingness 
to punish norm violators if the victim of the violation belongs to different groups. If the punisher 
and recipient belong to the same group, dictators punish less. Simpson (2006) finds that first 
movers in the sequential dilemmas game are equally likely to cooperate with in-group and out-
group members. Given cooperation by the first mover in a sequential game, the second mover is 
more likely to cooperate with in-group than out-group members. Charness et al. (2007) confirm 
the effect of group membership on behaviors and also provide the evidence of group identity 
formation. They argue that simply writing “Row” on a board or allowing people to choose colors 
is not sufficient to induce groups which motivated behaviors; more is needed to create groups 
such as an audience or common group payoffs.  
 In addition, in operations management literature, there are only two studies that explore 
the impact of identity on supply chain decision making and supply chain performance. Corsten et 
al. (2011) suggest that supplier-to-buyer identification leads to higher trust, information 





(working paper) bring the concept of group identity between teams within a firm into supply 
chain forecasting and ordering context. They find that group identity can increase demand 
planners’ effort investment which also increases the whole supply chain performance. While the 
previous experiments have demonstrated when and to what extent social identity affects 
individual behaviors in various types of games in different disciplines, lack of the studies 
estimates its effects in the operations context. There is a call to investigate the effect of group 
identity in operations management context (Loch and Wu, 2008) and the purpose of this research 
is to address this call to investigate the influence of buyer-supplier identification on discretionary 
collaboration and the whole supply chain performance.  
Combining with management, psychology, behavioral economics, and operations 
management literature, buyer-supplier identification, in this research, is defined as the perceived 
oneness of a supplier/buyer with its partner’s organization and experience of its partner’s 
successes and failures as its own (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). According to this definition, this is 
an individual-level concept and organization is the entity that represents the group. In particular, 
an employee who works for the supplier’s company generates the same identity with the 
retailer’s company and identifies with the retailer’s company. Similarly, an employee who works 
for the retailer’s company generates the same identity with the supplier’s company and identifies 
with the supplier’s company. He/she perceives the oneness of retailer and supplier companies, 
and he/she perceives that he/she belongs to his/her partner’s company. Buyer-supplier 
identification compels either a buyer or a supplier to sometimes sacrifice his/her own interests 
for the benefit of his/her partner—strong feelings are aroused, such as fondness, caring, 
sentimentality, and love, which may be sufficiently strong for the buyer and supplier to 





In conclusion, previous literature has shown that organizational identification can 
increase the support of the organization (Mael and Ashforth, 1992), cooperation (Dukerich, et al., 
2002), performance (Randel and Jaussi, 2003; Hekman et al., 2009), creativity (Farmer et al., 
2003), and perceived solidarity (Willer et al., 2012). Similarly, experimental economics has the 
comparable findings. They find that if individuals generate identity with their group members, 
they are likely to be more charity, less envy, more concerned about social welfare maximization 
(Chen and Li, 2009), more altruistic (Bernhard et al., 2006), and have higher level of trust 
(Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo, 2009). Therefore, I assume that buyer-supplier identification may 
have the similar impact on supplier chain outcomes. 
Research Hypotheses 
Effects of Buyer-Supplier Identification on Discretionary Collaboration 
 Discretionary collaboration is defined as behaviors performed by an employee who 
works for a supplier/retailer to help his/her partner’s company; These behaviors contribute to the 
effective functioning of the buyer-supplier relationship, are outside formal contractual 
obligations, and are performed without expectation of direct reward (Guskey and Heckman, 
1994). In the buyer-supplier relationship, various behaviors are expected from each party. For 
example, retailers are expected to share forecasting information with the supplier to help them 
better plan for production. Similarly, suppliers are expected to provide product information or 
make a delivery. A formal contract can define roles and responsibilities performed in the 
relationship. However, Wuyts (2007) has observed that suppliers or retailers do more than what 





 Previous literature has found that satisfaction with their partners’ performance, relational 
bonds, individuals’ attributes, switching cost, and role formalization can shape discretionary 
collaboration (Wuyts, 2007; Heckman and Guskey, 1998). Kelman (1958) proposes that social 
identity is an important internal value in shaping individuals’ behaviors. When buyer-supplier 
identification forms, it reduces the differentiation between the supplier firm and the buyer firm 
which increases the consideration of collective benefits rather than individual decision making 
(Brewer, 1979). Both suppliers and retailers perceive that they belong to one entity rather than 
two different organizations. It shifts either the supplier or the buyer’s focus from the self to 
his/her partner and the relationship. 
Buyer-supplier identification can compel individuals to sacrifice their own interests for 
the benefit of the group due to the in-group favoritism. Strong feelings are aroused toward their 
in-group members, such as fondness, caring, sentimentality, and love. These positive emotions 
may be sufficient enough to trigger group members to give up benefits to peers (Loch and Wu, 
2007). Therefore, as Hogg and Abrams (1988) noted, attraction increases with the formation of 
identification because it arouses a favorable bias toward their members by regarding them as 
relatively trustworthy, honest, and cooperative (Brewer, 1981). Therefore, the depersonalized or 
group-based trust is formed through this process  (Brewer, 1981). Trust based on group 
identification facilitates discretionary collaboration because it reduces the fear that other group 
members will exploit cooperation by not reciprocate it. They treat collaboration to benefit not 
only the relationship but also themselves. Therefore, this study offers the following hypothesis: 







Effects of Buyer-Supplier Identification on Performance 
 When existing buyer-supplier identification, suppliers and buyers perceive overlap goals, 
values, and beliefs, and they also have shared language to facilitate communication (Crosten et 
al., 2012). Therefore, they are more likely and willing to share information with each other to 
smooth the communication and reduce misunderstanding and information asymmetry due to the 
perceived oneness generated through buyer-supplier identification. Previous research has shown 
that individuals with high organizational identification tend to make more contributions to their 
working teams or firms (van Knippenberg et al., 2004). It is because identification leads 
individuals to perceive themselves in terms of the characteristics they share with the organization 
(van Knippenber, 2000). As a result, individuals tend to expand more effort on behalf of the 
organization (van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Due to the higher effort level they put, employees 
are more motivated to achieve goals of their working organization (van Knippenberg, 2000). 
Since employees are more motivated and put more effort, the performance is more likely to be 
improved. 
 In addition, buyer-supplier identification makes suppliers and buyers experience the 
supply chain profit as self-interest (Leeuwen and van Knippenberg, 1999). Buyer-supplier 
identification can also motive suppliers and buyers to exert effort on the task, especially for 
members who are not taken others’ interests into account. The performance is also affected by 
expectations about the effort other members would invest in the group task. Higher expected 
effort from others would result in higher own performance. High buyer-supplier identification 
motivates both parties to perform more or less irrespective of the effort and performance they 
expect from their fellow group members. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that buyer-supplier 





Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of buyer-supplier identification, the higher the level of 
supply chain performance. 
Methodology 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design addresses the following objectives: to determine the effects of 
buyer-supplier identification on collaboration and joint performance in buyer-supplier 
relationships. Furthermore, it evaluates different ways to create buyer-supplier identification in 
the laboratory, to explore the formation of identification, and to investigate the foundation of 
what buyer-supplier identification is. 
There are different ways to shape identity. Minimal group paradigm (MGP)—groups are 
created using trivial and sometimes almost meaningless tasks—was first used by Tajfel et al. 
(1971) to test social identity theory in the psychology literature. It creates groups by using trivial 
and sometimes almost meaningless tasks and is one of the most frequent ways employed to form 
groups. For example, Hertel and Kerr (2001) creat groups with an alleged “test of cognitive 
representation styles”. Otten and Wentura (1999) assign their subjects to either concave or 
convex groups in their first experiment and either figure or ground groups in the second 
experiment. In the experiment economics literature, scholars use the similar scheme to form 
groups. For instance, Chen and Li (2009) assign groups by painting preferences. Chen and Chen 
(2011) name two different groups as red or green. Those studies indicate that minimum group 
paradigm is sufficient enough to create in-group favoritism.  
Second, shared experience is another way to form identity. Neville and Reicher (2011) 





(2004) argue that problem-solving with the other firm can generate knowledge and capacity for 
the relationship which could help both firms to have shared identity. Similarly, Kogut and 
Zander (1996) suggest that social interactions in groups facilitate not only communication and 
coordination but also learning. It is through learning that coordination and communication are 
facilitated through identity. 
Lastly, physical presence may also generate identity. Short et al. (1976) is the first to 
mention social presence theory and postulate that social presence is a critical factor in 
communication and define social presence as the "degree of salience of the other person in the 
interaction and the consequent salience of the interpersonal relationships" (p. 65). Social 
presence has two dimensions: intimacy (Argyle and Dean 1965) and immediacy (Short et al. 
1976). 
 Short et al. (1976) provide the evidence that social presence can create a higher level of 
intimate due to shorter physical distance, more eye contact, and more smile. For example, 
compared to audio-only communication, television makes greater intimacy due to more visual 
cues such as eye contact, smile, or body languages (Gunawardena 1995). Second, immediacy is a 
measure of the psychological distance that a person perceives between himself/herself and the 
other person/people that he/she is communicating with. Immediacy can enhance social presence. 
Therefore, with the social presence, individuals may feel more connections with their group 
members and create a higher level of buyer-supplier identification.  
 According to the above discussion, there are different ways to create buyer-supplier 
identification. Therefore, this experiment employed four treatments and one control treatment to 





randomly and anonymously paired to play the role of either the supplier or retailer. The matched 
group members are in the fixed role in the 23 periods.  
 In the control treatment, each subject gets an envelope which contains a white index card 
with a subject ID (Chen and Chen2011). There is no information in the instruction that indicates 
the buyer and supplier have previous interactions. The first experimental treatment (minimum 
group) implies a relationship in the instruction. Each subject gets an envelope which contains a 
white index card with a subject ID, company names (PreOcean company and OriLava company), 
and a company logos. In the experimental task, I also put the join company names and logos in 
the subjects’ decision screen. This process initiates a relationship, which is reinforced by the 
following written paragraph in the instruction “People work for the team in PreOcean Company 
that only works with OriLava Company’s business. The two companies work closely together 
and collaborate on supply chain issues. They share information to help with demand forecasting 
and replenishment of inventory”. 
 The second experimental treatment is to make identification more salient through an 
online problem-solving task (Enhanced group 1). Other than the previous manipulation, subjects 
do a pre-experiment problem-solving task—a painting task that adapted from Chen and Li 
(2009) only with their matched partners. Before the real experimental task, subjects are provided 
with a folder that has five pairs of paintings. In each pair of the paintings, there is one painted by 
Paul Klee and the other one is painted by Wassily Kandinsky. The five pairs of paintings include 
the key indicating which of the two artists painted each of the ten paintings. The last two pages 
of the folder are shown two final paintings and subjects are told that each of them is painted by 
the same artist. The subjects are then asked to determine, within ten minutes, which artist painted 





only with their assigned partners, but they are not required to make contributions to the online 
communication. Subjects make individual decisions and are not required to tell their partners 
what decisions they have made. For each correct answer, a subject earns 50,000 additional 
experimental dollars. Subjects are notified what the correct answers were until the end of the 
experiment when they got their payment (Chen and Li, 2009). 
 To test the difference between an online shared experience and face-to-face shared 
experience, we have the third treatment (Enhanced group 2) that subjects solve the painting task 
face-to-face rather than online communication after the minimum group paradigm manipulation. 
Before the real experimental task, subjects meet their matching partner in one of the breakout 
rooms in the laboratory and solve the same painting problem presented in the above. They can 
communicate with each other face-to-face to help and get help to answer the questions within 10 
minutes.   
 The fourth treatment is to mimic the phenomenon of collocation in the real setting, and I 
named it as the advanced group. Beyond the joint company names and logos and face-to-face 
problem-solving task, subjects do the real experimental task in front of each other. They can see 
each other’s face, but they cannot see their partner’s screen which is the decision. No 
communication is allowed in this treatment. 
Participants 
A total of 284 participants is recruited from a large southern university, mostly 
undergraduates, from various fields of study who volunteered through an online recruitment 
system from a database of 3500 students at a medium-sized university in the US. The task was 





subjects finish the post-experiment questionnaire, privately and in cash. They received an initial 
endowment of $5.00 for showing up at the lab. In addition, the average payment for the 
approximately one hour task is $11.11. The summary of the treatments is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary of the treatments 












Control group N/A N/A N/A N/A 56 
Minimum group Yes N/A N/A N/A 58 
Enhanced 1 group Yes Yes N/A N/A 60 
Enhanced 2 group  Yes Yes Yes N/A 52 
Advanced group Yes Yes Yes Yes 58 
Total        284 
Note. Half the subjects play the role of supplier and the other half play the role of retailer.  
Experimental Procedure and Software 
Experimental procedure 
All 16 experimental sessions followed the similar protocol. Participants arrive at the 
computer lab at the designated time and are randomly and anonymously assigned to the role of 
either supplier or retailer according to the index card they draw at the beginning of the 
experiment. In the control and minimum treatments, paper-based instruction including two 
parts—general instruction with basic lab rule and payment structure and forecasting task 
instruction is provided to the subjects. After finish reading the instruction, subjects watch a video 
which highlights the important component of the instruction followed by the forecasting task. In 
the enhanced group 1 treatment, subjects do the pre-experiment painting task before the 
forecasting task and their instruction includes the painting task instruction between the general 





In the enhanced 2 and advanced treatments. The procedure is slightly different. After 
subjects draw the index card at the beginning of the experiment, they go to the breakout room in 
the laboratory for the pre-experiment painting task. In the breakout room, the instruction 
including general and painting task instructions are provided. After finishing the painting task, 
subjects move to the computer lab for the forecasting task. Forecasting task instruction is 
provided in the computer lab. After reading the forecasting task instruction, subjects watch a 
video which highlights the important component of the forecasting task. The only difference 
between enhanced group 2 treatment and advanced treatment is that subjects sit in front of each 
other when they do the forecasting task in the advanced group treatment. The forecasting task 
lasts 20 periods with three practice rounds for all the treatment. 
At the end of the experiment, all the subjects are asked to complete a post-experiment 
questionnaire with the manipulation checks and individual differences as control variables. 
Tasks and software 
The forecasting task is adapted from Ozer et al. (2014). Consider a two-tier supply chain 
with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier produces a product and sells to the retailer, who 
then sells the product to the end customers. Because of retailer’s proximity to the customers, the 
retailer has better demand forecast information. The supplier wants to solicit this information to 
plan his production before demand is realized. In this paper, the final customer demand is 
random and modeled as D=ξ+ε. The notion of ξ represents the retailer’s private forecast 
information since he/she is close to final customers. It is deterministically known to the retailer, 
whereas the supplier only knows that it is a random variable distributed on [	ξ , ξ ] with 





notation of ε is the market uncertainty of the product. Both parties only know that it is a zero-
mean random variable distributed on [	ε , ε] with c.d.f. G(.) and p.d.f. g(.). I assume ξ + ε >0 to 
ensure that demand is positive. 
To sequence of the task is as follows: (i) The retailer observes his /her private forecast 
information ξ and submits a report ξ to the supplier; (ii) the supplier receives the report ξ and 
produces Q units of the product at the unit cost of c; (iii) demand D is realized and the retailer 
purchases min (D, Q) from the supplier at a unit whole-sale price of w; (iv) the retailer sells the 
product to the end customers at a unit retail price of r and both parties’ profits are realized. 
Similarly as Ozer et al. (2014), we assume r≥w≥c≥0 to ensure profitable production.  
Given Q and ξ the supplier’s and retailer’s expected profits are 
The supplier’s expected profit: ∏%(',ξ)=w)εmin(ξ+ ε, Q)-cQ 
The retailer’s expected profit: ∏*(',ξ)=(r-w) )εmin(ξ+ ε, Q) 
The profit calculation indicates that the expected profit functions that the retailer does not 
incur any direct cost by reporting, ξ is not a binding order, and whether ξ equals ξ cannot be 
perfectly verified even ex-post due to the existence of ε. Therefore, the retailer’s report is 
costless, nonbinding, and nonverifiable, known as “cheap talk” in the literature (Crawford and 
Sobel 1982). If ξ is known to the supplier, the optimal quantity is '∗ , = , + /01/ 	ε − ε +
ε (Ozer et al. 2014). As a benchmark, in the centralized supply chain, the optimal production 
quantity is '1 , = , + 3013 	ε − ε + ε and the resulting optimal expected profit is (  ξ, 





In all treatments, r=150, w=100, c=50 to ensure that the cost of overstocking is equal to 
the cost of understocking, ξ and ε are uniformly distributed on [100, 400] and [-75, 75], 
respectively. The task is programmed in z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Results 
 Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the participants’ decisions and the measures of 
supplier’s and retailer’s discretionary collaboration. I highlight three preliminary observations. 
First, retailers reduced the inflation of their forecast report with the increased buyer-supplier 
identification and suppliers also decided to reduce less of their production quantity according to 
their retailer’s report with the increased buyer-supplier identification. Compared retailers’ report 
inflation with suppliers’ production quantity reduction, the evidence shows that with the 
increased buyer-supplier identification, suppliers are more willing to exhibit discretionary 
collaboration with their retailers, that is, suppliers significantly reduced less in their production 
quantity than retailers’ report inflation (Wilcoxon signed rank tests, p<0.01). Second, the 
correlation between ξ̂ and ξ and between Q and ξ̂ are strong and significantly positive in all 
treatments (t-test, p<0.01). This result indicates that retailers conveyed useful information about 
their private forecasts to suppliers, and suppliers relied on the retailer's report to make production 
decisions with the higher level of buyer-supplier identification. Further, the correlation between ξ̂ 
and ξ and between Q and ξ̂ are stronger with the increased buyer-supplier identification except 
for the suppliers in enhanced 1 treatment. This result provides the evidence that buyer-supplier 






Table 2: Treatments Summary Statistics: Mean, (Standard Deviation) 
Treatments (ξ̂-ξ) Cor(ξ̂, ξ) (Q-ξ̂) Cor(Q,ξ̂) 
Control  64.59 (49.43) 0.85 56.56 (64.34) 0.76 
Minimum 46.88 (34.53) 0.92 40.62 (45.83) 0.86 
Enhanced 1 30.65 (32.63) 0.94 32.51 (70.44) 0.71 
Enhanced 2 25.13 (27.13) 0.95 20.51 (41.95) 0.89 
Advanced 12.62 (12.26) 0.99 7.31 (15.27) 0.98 
Note. Label "Cor" means correlation. All correlations are significant with p<0.01 
Test for Collaboration for Suppliers and Retailers 
 We first discuss retailers’ collaboration which is measured by (ξ̂-ξ). Retailers have the 
least forecast inflation indicates that they exhibit collaborative behaviors most. Figure 1 
visualizes the average forecast inflation (measuring retailer’s discretionary collaboration). I 
assume that if retailers collaborate with their suppliers, they will not inflate their report for their 
self-interest. Since retailers do not involve any cost of over-production, they have the self-
interest to inflate the report to guarantee that their suppliers produce enough products for them to 
purchase. Results suggest that subjects in the minimum group which are only implemented the 
joint company names and logos has significantly reduced the forecasting inflation than those in 
the control group (p<0.01). This result shows that with minimum effort (put the two companies’ 
names and logos together), it successfully creates buyer-supplier identification and promotes 
retailers to generate discretionary collaboration. Similarly, compared to minimum group, 
subjects in enhanced group 1 which subjects solved a painting task together with an online 
chatting systems significantly reduced their forecast inflation (p<0.01). This result suggests that 
shared experience is a more efficient way to enhance buyer-supplier identification which makes 
retailers more willing to collaborate. Third, there is no significant difference between enhance 





that shared experience matters for retailers but it does not matter whether it is online or face-to-
face. Subjects exhibit the similar collaborative behaviors. Lastly, compared to enhanced group 1 
and enhanced group 2, subjects in advanced group which they collocated with each other when 
making decisions significantly reduce the forecast report inflation (p<0.01). This result provides 
the evidence that physical presence is the most sophisticated way to advance buyer-supplier 
identification.  
 
Figure 1: Retailer’s report inflation 
 Second, suppliers’ collaboration is measured by their production reduction (Q- ξ̂). 
Suppliers have the least production reduction indicates that they exhibit collaborative behaviors 
most. Figure 2 visualizes production adjustment differences (measuring supplier’s discretionary 
collaboration). Since suppliers make the production plan according to retailers’ forecast report, 
collaborative suppliers would produce the quantity based on retailers’ report rather than reducing 
the production quantity to ensure the limited cost of over-production. Results indicate that 
subjects in the minimum group significantly reduced the production adjustment than those in the 
control group (p<0.01), but no significant difference compared to enhanced group 1. However, if 
they solved the problem face-to-face with their retailers, they significantly reduced their 





















for suppliers when they did a “team-building” task beforehand and they are more collaborative, 
but if they only solve the problem online with the retailers without physical presence, there is no 
significant difference in discretionary collaboration. Further, subjects did not significantly reduce 
their production adjustment compared enhanced group 1 with enhanced group 2 which indicates 
that if the suppliers can have some shared experience, either online problem solving or face-to-
face problem solving does not make a difference. Finally, subjects in an advanced group 
significantly reduce production adjustment compared to enhanced group 2 (p<0.01) which 
provide further evidence that physical presence is the most sophisticated way to enhance buyer-
supplier identification for both suppliers and retailers. 
 
Figure 2: Supplier’s production reduction 
Test for Performance for Suppliers and Retailers 
 The above discussions demonstrate that buyer-supplier identification significantly 
impacts the levels of discretionary collaboration for both suppliers and retailers in a supply 
chain. The next step is to quantify these impacts on the resulting supply chain performance. 
Supplier chain performance is calculated by the total of supplier’s expected profit 
(∏%(',ξ)=w)εmin(ξ+ ε, Q)-cQ) and retailer’s expected profit (∏*(',ξ)=(r-w) )εmin(ξ+ ε, Q)). 




















those in control group (p<0.01), minimum group (p<0.01), enhanced 1 group (p<0.05), and 
enhanced 2 group (p<0.01). This result provides the evidence that subjects perform much better 
when they collocate with their partners. However, there is no significant difference in 
performance among control group, minimum group, enhanced group 1, and enhanced group 2. 
 In terms of supply chain efficiency which is 4 ,, ' = [∏%(',ξ)+	∏*(',ξ)]/	 (  ξ, 
'1(ξ)), results indicate that collocated supply chain (Advanced group) has significantly higher 
efficiency compared to enhanced group 1 (p<0.05) and enhanced group 2 (p<0.1). Table 3 






Table 3: Treatment Comparisons 
Comparison Retailer forecast inflation 
Supplier production 
reduction SC performance Efficiency 
Control Minimum -17.51 (6.81)** -15.95 (8.58)** 337.39 (462.91) -0.02 (0.05) 
 Enhanced 1 -16.95 (3.26)** -12.03 (5.94)* 83.22 (351.77) -0.01 (0.02) 
 Enhanced 2 -13.08 (2.25)** -12.02 (2.96)** 155.05 (162.97) -0.002 (0.01) 
  Advanced -12.97 (1.50)** -12.31 (1.92)** 324.10 (106.97)** 0.01 (0.006) 
Minimum Enhanced 1 -16.24 (4.64)** -8.11 (9.85) -200.98 (597.07) -0.003 (0.05) 
 Enhanced 2 -10.84 (2.27)** -10.05 (2.78)** 64.15 (152.91) -0.006 (0.03) 
  Advanced -11.43 (1.25)** -11.10 (1.35)** 315.48 (80.32)** 0.02 (0.01) 
Enhanced 1 Enhanced 2 -5.57 (4.23) -12.00 (10.26) 355.84 (624.72) -0.02 (0.04) 
  Advanced -8.97 (1.72)** -12.60 (4.56)** 564.39 (285.53)* 0.03 (0.01)** 
Enhanced 2 Advanced -12.48 (3.01)** -13.20 (3.86)** 805.45 (244.05)** 0.05 (0.03)+ 
Note. p-values are derived from random effects. 










Discussions and Conclusions 
 This paper investigates the effect of buyer-supplier identification on supply chain 
discretionary collaboration and performance in the context of forecast information sharing. It 
also explores the formation and foundation of buyer-supplier identification. In particular, this 
study focuses on a two-tier supply chain in which the upstream supplier solicits demand forecast 
information from the downstream retailer to make production decisions, and the retailer has an 
incentive to inflate her private forecast. Two key findings show that buyer-supplier identification 
is one of the crucial factors that can improve both supplier’s and retailer’s discretionary 
collaborative behaviors. Specifically, suppliers are more sensitive to the identification, and they 
are more willing to collaborate with their retailers if they form the buyer-supplier identification 
with their retailers. This result indicates that suppliers are more vulnerable in the supply chain 
since he/she has to depend on his/her retailer’s forecast report to make the production plan. 
Buyer-supplier identification can promote discretionary collaborative behaviors which makes 
retailers consider their partner’s welfare and the supply chain profit more than their own profits. 
Therefore, suppliers are more likely to collaborate. Second, collocation matters! For example, 
most of the major retailers such as Walmart, Costco, or Kroger highly recommend their suppliers 
have a dedicated team that collocates with them and only works on the relationship with them. 
There are some operational benefits of collocation such as more information sharing, faster 
decision-making process, or faster problem identifying and solving. However, this research 
shows that there are also some behavioral benefits generating from collocation. Collocation can 
create the strongest buyer-supplier identification which makes suppliers and retailers perceive 
shared goals and interests; they are more willing to consider the supply chain profit rather than 





solutions. They are more likely to collaborate with their partners to achieve the supply chain 
efficiency. It concludes that buyer-supplier identification which is created by collocation may be 
an efficient non-economics factor that can promote discretionary collaboration in buyer-supply 
relationships.  
 This research contributes to supply chain management literature in the following ways. 
First, the supply chain literature typically assumes that individuals are rational and decision 
making is based on expected profit maximization. A recent stream of research on behavioral 
operations management has demonstrated that this is not always the case and there are many 
factors that lead individuals to make decisions that deviate from self-profit-maximization 
solutions. For example, Loch and Wu (2008) find that relationship and status are aspects of 
social preferences that can influence individuals’ behaviors as much as economic incentives. 
This research proposes buyer-supplier identification is another aspect of social preferences that 
acts as an alternative of economic incentives to promote voluntary behaviors. It enables firms to 
be more willing to collaborate and sacrifice their own profits to benefit both their peers and the 
supply chain.  
 Second, the majority of the identity research focus on organizational identity in 
management literature or group identity in the experimental economics literature. The similarity 
of the two streams of research is that they emphasize that the individuals identify with either 
their organization or their groups members (Dukerich et al., 2002; Mael and Ashforth, 1992; 
Ashforth and Mael, 1996; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2011). To our knowledge, there is 
only two research in operations management literature that explore the role of identity. Papier et 
al. (working paper) focus on the group identity between demand planner and production planner 





new concept—the supplier-to-buyer identification in the inter-organizational level, but it only 
targeted in the supplier side and the supplier identified with the retailer. This research explores 
identity that employees who work for a company that identified with their partner’s company. It 
is the relationship that outside of their own company. It emphasizes that an employee from a 
supplier firm/a buyer firm identified himself/herself to the buyer/supplier firm rather than his/her 
own firm. The supply chain relationship becomes an entity that creates buyer-supplier 
identification. 
 Third, this research is the first to employ a controlled laboratory experiment to explore 
the formation and foundation of buyer-supplier identification. We stick with the experimental 
economics literature and psychology literature that minimum group paradigm and shared 
experience can form the identity. However, we also mimic the real-world phenomenon—
collocation—to test whether collocation can further enhance identification between supplier and 
retailers. This helps us to understand the behavioral benefits of collocation beyond the 
operational benefits.  
 Our findings offer several managerial implications for suppliers and retailers. First, 
buyer-supplier identification leads to systematic and beneficial patterns of behaviors, managers 
especially managers working for suppliers’ firms should think strategically about forming 
identification with their buyer firms. Previous literature has shown that power imbalance is 
always existing in the buyer-supplier relationship and the weaker party has perceived higher 
uncertainty which can reduce trust, commitment, and willingness to innovate (Ma et al., wp). By 
forming stronger buyer-supplier identification, it may balance the negative effect of power 





 Second, previous literature has shown that monetary incentives and contracts can regulate 
firms’ behaviors. However, it has negative consequences such as crowding out intrinsic 
motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001), deception (Gneezy, 2005), and dishonesty (Mazar et al., 
2008). It is also costly to have a complete contract. Buyer-supplier identification can promote 
voluntary behaviors and act as an aspect of social preferences that may be more efficient and 
effective than monetary incentives and the formal contract.   
 Third, collocation is one of the most efficient ways to enhance buyer-supplier 
identification. It encourages retailers and suppliers work closely with each other. If suppliers are 
willing to establish a high-quality relationship with their major retailers, collocation is one of 
choices.  
 However, this research also has some limitations. First, this research only examined 
induced buyer-supplier identification and did not take the culture differences into consideration. 
People are from different backgrounds and behave differently in various culture backgrounds. 
For example, Westerners are more individualism and Easterners are more inclined to be 
collective. Further research may disentangle the effect of culture differences from induced buyer-
supplier identification. Second, this research only considers the two-tier supply chain with one 
supplier and one retailer in the relationship. It would also be interesting to explore multi-supplier 
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III. ESSAY 2 
 








“This is a topic very close to my heart.  As a female in two very male dominated 
industries – supply chain/logistics AND recruitment, I feel very passionately about flying 
the flag for women in my profession.” 
         -----JPS Supply Chain 
 As the world becomes increasingly integrated, and the workforce becomes more diverse, 
motivating more females to enter male-dominant careers and making them work efficiently with 
males are major challenges facing supply chain firms today. Women own their innate 
characteristics: intuition, flexibility, empathy, leadership, and multi-tasking abilities (Blasgen, 
2011). One benefit of diversity is that people with different backgrounds may have different 
viewpoints (Adams and Funk, 2012) which may add value and creativity to the team. Previous 
literature has shown that diverse groups perform better at problem-solving related tasks than 
homogenous groups because both males and females can use their advantages to contribute to the 
team (Hong and Page, 2001). However, problems occur in the single-gender team especially 
male-dominated teams. For example, Kristof (2009) provides evidence that single-gender 
especially male-dominant top management team of financial firms is one of the important factors 
that contributes to the poor financial performance of banks. Therefore, this research is trying to 
understand how to motivate team work effectively and efficiently together. Particularly, it is 
investigating the impact of gender composition on trust, trustworthiness, and collaboration in 
buyer-supplier relationships.  
 Previous literature has shown that males and females behave differently and these 
differences would impact the economic outcomes. Men and women make different decisions in 
terms of risk preference, social preference, reciprocal behaviors, and competition (Apesteguia et 





emotions toward risky choice and they may treat risk as a threat, while men may treat risk as a 
challenge and may be overconfident about their success (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). However, 
these differences on risk preference did not observe in the top management team. A woman 
executive does not lead to the more risk-averse decision (Adams and Funk, 2012) and a female 
can be risk-seeking if she works in the top management team. Further, women, in general, are 
more inequality averse (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), but they show less trust compared to 
men (Eckel and Wilson, 2004). A vast of literature shows that women behave the same as men in 
terms of reciprocity (Eckel and Wilson, 2004), but the findings are inconsistent that women are 
less reciprocal than men. Also, regarding cooperation, women are found to be more cooperative 
than men, especially in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Croson and Gneezy (2009) argue that 
females may be more sensitive to the context and social cues and they may adjust their behaviors 
according to the current context or match the social cues rather than making rational decisions, 
while men are more rational and less likely to make context-specific decisions and respond to 
social cues (Gilligan, 1982). Lastly, studies have differentiated competitive behaviors between 
men and women. They find that women are less likely to enter into a competitive environment, 
and they prefer teamwork rather than competition with their teammates (Eckel and Fullbrunn, 
2015). 
 While a vast of research focuses on gender differences, these studies are done at the 
individual level which spotlight on the individual behaviors and performance, despite people are 
working together to make the team work effectively and efficiently. In the most recent literature, 
researchers have paid more attention to gender composition at the team level. Apesteguia et al. 
(2012) implement a L’Oreal e-Start challenge game to examine how gender composition (3-





compositions, if a team has three female members, they are less aggressive in their pricing 
strategies and invest less in research and development, but invest more in social sustainability 
initiatives. These less aggressive decisions make them outperform among all gender 
compositions. However, these studies are done at the team level within an organization. 
Considering a buyer-supplier relationship that a retailer works with a supplier, the retailer’s job 
is to forecast for the final customer demand since he/she is closer to the final customer and the 
supplier’s job is to produce products to make sure he/she produces enough for his/her retailer to 
sell. This relationship can be considered as a team, but not within an organization. It is the inter-
organizational relationship. However, There lack studies that investigate how the gender 
composition in buyer-supplier relationships between organizations impact the quality of supply 
chain relationship and supply chain performance. 
 According to social identity theory, individuals generate in-group favoritism and out-
group discrimination to enhance and maintain positive self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). As 
a consequence, they perceive that their in-group members own similar traits as them compared to 
out-group members (Allen and Wilder, 1975). Due to the similarity, individuals are more likely 
to assign the positive traits to their in-group members and negative traits to out-group members 
(Brewer, 1979). Therefore, they are more likely to help their in-group members than the out-
group members (Crosby et al., 1980), allocate more resources to in-group members than out-
group members (Wilder, 1986), and to show more charity, less envy, more reciprocity, to in-
group members than out-group members (Chen and Li, 2009).  
There are different ways to recognize identity. In the real world, individuals can have 
multiple identities simultaneously (Hewstone 1996). Considering an Asian American female, she 





time—she identified with other females, she identified herself into an Asian group, she identified 
herself into mom’s club, and she identified herself with her working organization. Some of the 
identities are induced such as the mom’s club, or the identity of the organization, but some of the 
identities are natural such as gender or ethnicity. Previous literature has shown that gender 
identity can alter individual’s behaviors (Dittmar et al., 1995; Ely, 1995; Egan and Perry, 2001), 
and can create common goals and values (Chen et al., 2014). Therefore, understanding the 
impact of gender composition can help firm shape their teams to make their team members work 
more effectively and efficiently.  
This study provides several contributions. First, different from most studies that are 
examining induced group identity in the laboratory, this study focuses on the individuals’ 
existing natural identity—gender identity. Thus, compared to the induced group identity, results 
provided in this study can be easily applied to the real-life environments. Second, this study 
extends the previous literature to the effect of gender composition on buyer-supplier 
collaboration and performance. Most of the previous studies are only focusing on individual 
level gender differences, but this study is conducted at the team level that examining the salient 
of gender identity of their partners. It also explores the differences between females and males in 
trust and trustworthiness in buyer-supplier relationships. Third, this study is the first in 
operations management literature to use gender identity as a non-economic tool to promote trust, 
trustworthiness, collaboration, and supply chain performance. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. It provides a literature review on gender 
differences in the next section, following with hypotheses development. After the hypotheses, 
this paper presents the details of the controlled laboratory experiment and results. In the last 






 Gender is widely recognized to be an important empirical factor in understanding many 
aspects of behaviors (Steward and McDermott, 2004). The usefulness of social identity theory 
for this study lies in the theory’s attempts to capture how individuals’ identity in a group shapes 
their perspectives and experiences. Ashforth and Mael (1989) mention that identity has two 
components: a personal and a social component. The personal component is derived from 
individual’s characteristics, such as personality and physical and intellectual traits; and a social 
component is derived from salient group memberships, such as sex, race, class, and nationality 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Gender identity is included in the individual’s social identity; it 
means that women may generate the group membership with the female group and they compare 
their female group with the male group. Identification with his/her own category can be 
associated with positive, negative, or ambivalent feelings, depending on the salience and nature 
of comparative distinctions between men and women in a given setting. Once people generate 
their salient identity, they have a clear view and expectation that how they and other people who 
also belong to this category should behave. Previous literature in psychology, sociology, and 
experimental economics has explored the gender differences in risk preference, social 
preference, reciprocal behavior, and competition.  
 Many of the decisions are made under risk. However, previous literature has shown that 
females behave differently from males when they make risky decisions. It is because women are 
more risk-averse and men are more risk-seeking in the vast majority of environments and tasks 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Byrnes et al. (1999) conduct a meta-analysis of 150 studies in which 
the risk-taking tendencies of male and female participants are compared. They find that females 





physical skills. These differences are particularly pronounced when it comes to physical or life-
threatening risks (Hersch, 1997). In addition, gender differences in risk propensity have been 
observed in another context such as financial decision-making or investment decisions. Powell 
and Ansic (1997) examine whether gender differences in risk propensity and strategy in financial 
decision-making can be viewed as general traits. They find that females are less risk seeking than 
males irrespective of familiarity and framing, costs, or ambiguity. Results also indicate that 
males and females adopt different strategies in financial decision environments, but these 
strategies have no significant impacts on the ability to perform. Zinkhan and Karande (1991) 
provide evidence that when it comes to the investment decisions in which the situation is 
ambiguous and uncertain, females tend to be more conservative than males. 
 Experimental economics has also explored the gender differences in risk preference. 
Charness and Gneezy (2011) assemble 15 sets of experiments with one simple underlying 
investment game. They find that women tend to invest less and they appear to be more 
financially risk-averse than men. Felton et al. (2002) conduct a semester-long experiment to 
examine the role of gender on the riskiness of investment choices of students. Results indicate 
that males are making more risky investment choices than females due to males’ overconfidence. 
Borghans et al. (2009) also document that women are more risk-averse than men. They provide 
insights into the relationship between psychological traits and economic preference parameters. 
Results indicate that personality traits such as agreeableness or neuroticism might be an 
explanation of gender differences. Croson and Greezy (2008) provide several explanations for 
the effect of gender differences on risk preference. Emotion might play a role in the gender 
difference on risky choices (Croson and Greezy, 2008). According to Loewenstein et al. (2001), 





women are asked to recall their saddest memory, positron emission tomography scans indicate 
that brain activity increases significantly more in the female brain than in the male brain 
(Andersson, 2001). Therefore, due to the intensive level of nervousness and fear experienced by 
females (Brody, 1993), they are more emotional intolerable than males for loss when they make 
risky choices. In addition, emotions may also affect the evaluation of outcomes as well as 
evaluation of probabilities (Croson and Greezy, 2008) which hinder females to make risky 
decisions. Croson and Greezy (2008) also document that overconfidence (males tend to be 
overconfident in their success in uncertain situations than women) and different interpretations of 
risk (males view risk as challenge and females perceive risk as a threat) are other reasons that 
may explain the gender difference in risk preference.  
 Previous literature has also documented gender differences in social preference. Social 
preference includes fairness perceptions such as inequity aversion, trust, altruism, and reciprocity 
in the experimental economics literature (Levitt and List, 2007). Solnick and Schweitzer (1999) 
explore gender differences on perceived fairness in the ultimatum game setting. They report that 
men are treated differently from women. Individuals are more generous toward men than toward 
women. Solinick (2001) did a follow-up study to examine the behaviors of men and women in 
the ultimatum game. This study has provided evidence that gender composition can alter 
individual’s behaviors. First, results indicate that men and women offer the similar amount to 
their partners without knowing their parnter’s gender, but in terms of the receivers, men received 
more than women. Further, people expect that women should be satisfied with a smaller share or 
should accept less, but in his experimental setting, females choose higher minimum acceptable 
amounts compared to men. Due to the same reason, both men and women offer less to women. 





no matter men or women, pair with a woman, they set their minimum acceptable amount higher 
compared to those who are paired with a man. Further, Guth et al. (2007) employ a three-person 
bargaining experiment and consistent with previous results, women are more inequity averse 
which means they care more about equal distributions. Similarly, Eckel and Grossman (1997) 
use a “punishment game” where subjects can choose to split a larger pie with a “bad” partner, or 
a smaller pie with a “good” partner to explore the gender differences in the impact of fairness on 
the outcome. Results suggest that men are less likely to punish unfair behaviors compared to 
women. This result is consistent with previous literature. For males, fairness is more of an 
absolute statement and a matter of principle—one is either fair or unfair. Fairness for a male is 
independent of other factors such as price. That might be because men are more rational and only 
do what is “right” regardless of the price. However, females are irrational, and they put greater 
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the decision.  
 Males are not only different from females in perceived fairness, but also in trust and 
trustworthiness (reciprocity). With respect to the literature on trusting, both survey results and 
experimental findings show that, in general, men trust more than women. Alesina and La Ferrar 
(2002) suggest that women are less likely to believe that most people can be trusted according to 
the information provided by the General Social Survey (GSS). By using the same survey source, 
Irwin et al. (2015) report consistent results that females exhibit less trust compared to males. 
Croson and Buchan (1999) use a trust game in the laboratory to explore the gender difference in 
trust and trustworthiness. They find that males and females offer the similar amount to their 
partners, but females return significantly more than males. This result indicated that females and 
males exhibit the same level of trust, but women show significantly more reciprocity 





men trust more than women, and women are more trustworthy than men. In addition, results 
suggest that men are just as trusting and trustworthy toward women as toward other men, and 
women are just as trusting and trustworthy toward men as toward other women.  
 To answer the question why males are different from females in term of trust, the most 
two popular explanations are altruism and reciprocity. Croson and Buchan (1999) argue that 
women are more altruistic than men. For example, women care more about their partner’s 
consumption than men do. This can explain why females return more to their partners than men 
which are the measure of trust in the trust, ultimate, or investment game. Similar findings are 
provided in the experimental economics literature. For example, Nowell and Tinkler (1994) find 
that females are more altruism and collaborative compared to males.  Similarly, Andreoni and 
Vesterlund (2001) report that when altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is 
cheap, men are more altruistic. This result indicates that men are more responsive to price 
change and they are more likely to behave in extremes—either perfectly selfish or perfectly 
selfless. Irwin et al. (2015) provide evidence that females trust less than males. This result is 
consistent with Eckel and Grossman (1998)’s findings.  The results indicate that women are 
more generous and show much higher levels of reciprocity than males when the situation is 
certain.  
 Moreover, a series of psychology studies and experimental economic studies suggest that 
men are more competitive than women. For example, boys prefer spending most of their time at 
competitive games such as fighting games, but girls are more likely to select activities where 
there is no winner and no clear end point such as dress up games or cooking games (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). Previous literature has shown that women are less competitive than men. This 





evidence that it is less likely for a female to win the tournament. Therefore, there is a vast of 
literature that explores gender difference in reacting to competition and how to promote women 
to compete. Gneezy et al. (2003) ask both males and females to solve mazes on a computer for 
fifteen minutes. Their payment either based on a piece-rate or enrolled in a tournament. Results 
indicate that when subjects are paid based on a piece-rate, males perform slightly better than 
females, but not significantly better. However, when subjects are enrolled in a tournament, males 
perform significantly better than females. This result provides the evidence that males are more 
competitive than females. Similarly, when subjects are asked to choose their own incentive 
scheme when they solve a problem, males prefer selecting tournament to receive their 
compensation, but females are more likely to choose a piece-rate for their payment (Niederle and 
Vesterlund 2007). The result shows that women are shy away from competition and men 
embrace it. Gneezy et al. (2009) conduct a field experiment in Maasai, Tanzania, and Khasi, 
India. Maasai represents a patriarchal society, whereas the Khasi are matrilineal. They find that 
Maasai men opt to compete for approximately twice the rate as Maasai women. However, Khasi 
women compete more than Khasi men. Further, Gneezy et al. (2003) find that males perform 
significantly more efficient than females in a competitive environment and a significant increase 
in performance, but not for women. 
Therefore, some scholars are interested in how to promote females to compete. Healy and 
Pate (2011) suggest that teams can reduce the gender competition gap. If subjects are asked to 
choose whether to compete based on the combined performance of themselves and a teammate, a 
two-person team could significantly reduce the gender competition gap. Females prefer 
competing in teams, but males prefer competing in individuals. Moreover, Niederle et al. (2013) 





enter to a tournament. They find that guaranteeing women the equal representation among 
winners increases their entry to compete. This result suggests that if it is guaranteed that a certain 
amount of women would win, it encourages women to compete against the other women rather 
than men.  
Since previous literature shows that males are more competitive than females, does that 
indicate that women are more collaborative? In an early study, Rapoprt and Chammah (1965) 
find that men cooperate significantly more than women. However, the findings are inconsistent. 
Ortmann and Tichy (1999) report that women cooperate significantly more than males in the first 
round, but this collaborative behavior vanishes by the last round. In the meantime, some studies 
show that there are no gender differences on cooperation (Orbell et al., 1994). However, previous 
literature has pointed out that gender composition plays a significant role in changing 
individuals’ collaborative behaviors. For example, Charness and Rustichini (2011) implement a 
prisoner’s dilemma game with the presence of the third person. They find that males cooperate 
substantially less often when observed by their peer group, while females cooperate substantially 
more often. Similarly, Ortmann and Tichy (1999) indicate that females are significantly more 
cooperative in the mixed groups than in all-female groups.  
Lastly, females are different from males in negotiation. Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) 
suggest that men negotiate significantly better outcomes than women. Sutter et al. (2009) report 
that gender itself has no significant effect on bargaining, but gender composition does. If subjects 
are in the same gender, the negotiation process is more competitive and less efficient. Moreover, 
Stevens et al. (1993) indicate that women negotiate lower salaries than men even though they 






Research Hypotheses  
The Impact of Gender Composition on Collaboration 
 Supply chain collaboration is defined as two or more autonomous firms working jointly 
to plan and execute supply chain operations (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). Previous 
literature has shown that females are different from males in terms of risk preference, social 
preference, competition, and negotiation. On the one hand, women are kinder (Robichaud et al., 
2003), more agreeable (Feingold, 1994), and more supportive of their friends (Oswald et al., 
2004). On the other hand, males provide more help to strangers in need (Eagly and Crowley, 
1986), and have a stronger preference for coordinated social play as children (Ostrov et al., 
2004). Due to the different characteristics of males and females, it is interesting that how females 
and males behave differently when matched with the same gender or opposite gender as a team. 
 According to social identity theory, the similarity between individuals in the team can 
influence their behaviors. Turner et al. (1987) argue that the basis of objective attributes such as 
race, age, and gender can create salient group memberships for individuals themselves and 
people in the same group. Gender is sufficient enough to trigger in-group favoritism and out-
group discrimination (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). It may further create and maintain collaborative 
working relationships (McAllister, 1995). Individuals are more likely to perceive out-group 
members as dishonest, untrustworthy, and uncooperative compared to their in-group members 
(Brewer, 1979). In addition, Charness et al. (2007) investigate the effect of group membership on 
individual behaviors. They find that salient group membership influences behaviors that if 
people are observed by other members of the same group, they tend to make more aggressive 
decisions. Sutter (2009) extends their results and find that with salient group membership, a 





and Li (2009) test in-group and out-group allocations and responses and find that individuals are 
more likely to be pro-social and have positive perceptions when match with another in-group 
member. Since gender is treated as the natural identity of a person, when individuals work with a 
person with the same gender, they may exhibit in-group favoritism and more likely to collaborate 
when they face social dilemmas. Social dilemma in this paper is defined as “situations in which 
individuals must decide whether they will cooperate with others within a group, thus benefiting 
the group as a whole, or defect from the group, thus maximizing their own personal gains” 
(Dawes, 1980, p. 43). Therefore, individuals in the same-gender team in a buyer-supplier 
relationship are more likely to collaborate than the different-gender team. 
H1a: Compared to individuals in the opposite-gender team, those in the same-gender 
team from a buyer-supplier relationship are more likely to exhibit collaborative 
behaviors. 
 Further, it is not clear that whether both-male team is more likely to collaborate than 
both-female team, or vice versa. According to Gilligan (1982)’s argument, females and males 
approach moral problems in distinct ways that females are more inclined to emphasize the 
relationship and care, while males are more inclined to emphasize work, competition, and 
assertive. These varying gender role behaviors encourage women to define themselves more 
frequently than men in terms of relationships to other people, particularly close associates, and 
the related ability to maintain interpersonal harmony and social intimacy (Kellert and Berry, 
1987). In addition, as Maccoby (1992) suggests, girls’ same-gender interactions tend to be more 
cooperative and pro-social, whereas boys’ same-gender interactions tend to place greater 
emphasis on the social dominance. Human evolutionary history indicates that males compete 





Rustichini (2011) experimentally examine how males and females differ in social behaviors 
when same-gender peers observing their action. They find that males cooperate substantially less 
frequent when observed by their male peers in contrast that females cooperate substantially more 
often when observed by their female peers. Therefore, we are expecting that both-female team is 
more likely to collaborate in a buyer-supplier relationship compared to both-male team. 
H1b: Compared to individuals in the both-male team, those in the both-female team from 
a buyer-supplier relationship are more likely to exhibit collaborative behaviors. 
The Effect of Gender Composition on Trust and Trustworthiness 
 Trust is defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee and the 
trustor expects that the trustee will perform a particular action without any monitoring or control 
mechanisms (Schoorman et al., 2007). It is the individuals’ willingness to be vulnerable to their 
partners and they give their partners the power to have significant influence over their working 
lives (Mayer and Davis, 1999; Mayer and Gavin, 2005; Schoorman et al., 2007). Further, Mayer 
et al. (1995) introduce trustworthiness into the literature which is attributes or characteristics of a 
trustee that inspire trust. Trustworthiness includes three dimensions—ability, integrity, and 
benevolence. Ability focuses on competence, skills, efficiency, and dedication (Colquitt and 
Rodell, 2011) that whether the partners are qualified for the work or not; integrity reflects 
whether the partners can adhere to a set of acceptance principles or a set of shared values; and 
benevolence is the sense that whether the individual cares about his/her partner such as the profit 
(Colquitt and Rodell, 2011).  
Trust has been studied extensively in the literature, but trustworthiness especially the 





trustworthiness in ability is a crucial point to build the relationship because most of us need the 
service of an expert to make decisions or solve problems in some circumstance (Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer, 2006). For example, if you decide to purchase a used car from a person, you may 
want to ask a mechanic—the third party to check whether the car is reliable and in a good 
working condition. Two aspects of trust involved in this situation. The car does not have any 
problems according to the mechanic’s report, and you fully trust his report, and you fully trust 
the mechanic is well-qualified to do a full-inspection for all the potential problems. The former 
trust is you believe his integrity, and the latter is you trust his ability. In the buyer-supplier 
relationship, sometimes, suppliers/retailers are willing to trust each other’s integrity, but they do 
not trust their partners’ ability. Suppliers/retailers are not willing to work together not because 
they do not trust their partners’ integrity, but because do not think their partners have the ability 
to do a good job. 
 Previous literature has shown the gender differences in trust, but results are mixed. A 
bunch of studies find that there are no gender differences in trust. Croson and Buchan (1999) 
investigate in an interesting inter-cultural setup to explore gender differences in trust and 
trustworthiness (reciprocity). They find that no matter what nationality the trustor is, there is no 
significant difference between males and females. This result is also confirmed by Clark and 
Sefton (2001), Cox and Deck (2006), and Bohnet (2007). However, some studies report that 
males trust more than females. For example, Migheli (2007) conduct a trust game with a broad 
European sample size to explore whether social capital is an aspect that can explain trusting 
behaviors between females and males. He finds that after controlling social capital, males still 
trust more than females. Chaudhui and Gangadharan (2007), Buchan et al. (2008), and Garbarino 





are few studies that report females trust more than males. Bellemare and Kroger (2007) explore 
the gender difference in the investment decisions, finding that females trust more than males 
when making the investment decisions.  
 Croson and Gneezy (2008) provide several explanations for these inconsistent findings 
such that women are more sensitive to cues in the experimental context than men. Gilligan 
(1982) has the similar conclusion that men are more likely to be impacted by the context. 
However, all these studies only investigate trust in general and did not specify whether 
individuals trust their partners’ collaboration or whether their partners have the ability to perform 
the job. 
 The reason we examine trustworthiness is due to the stereotype of females. Several 
studies have shown that when making individuals’ gender identity salient especially when 
making female’s gender identity salient, individuals will perform differently with the same 
ability level. Females are more likely to suffer from stereotype threat, which is a “situational 
phenomenon that occurs when targets of stereotypes alleging intellectual inferiority are reminded 
of the possibility of confirming these stereotypes” (Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev, 2000, p. 365).  Nosek 
et al. (2002) find that females are stereotyped to be negatively toward math and science in 
contrast to males who are stereotyped as good at math and science when making their gender 
identity salient. Considering a male production manager from a supplier’s company that decides 
production plans and a female purchasing manager from a retailer’s company that forecasts the 
final customer demand, the male production manager may not fully trust the female purchasing 
manager’s ability to do a good job due to the stereotype of females that they are poor on math 
and science. To our knowledge, there is only one study that explores gender composition on trust 





between males and females on trust in collaboration, but men trust more in the (mathematical) 
abilities of their interaction partners than women. What we are interested in is when making 
gender identity salient, whether males trust less in the ability of their interaction partners if they 
work with a female. Further, whether females trust more in the ability of their interaction 
partners if they work with a male due to the stereotype of female and male.  
H2a: Compared to the opposite-gender team, Individuals in the same-gender team have a 
higher level of trust and trustworthiness. 
H2b: Compared to the female-female team, males in the male-male team have a higher 
level of trust and trustworthiness. 
H2c: Compared to female retailers in the opposite-gender team, male retailers in the 
opposite-gender team have a higher level of trust and trustworthiness. 
The Impact of Gender Composition on Buyer-supplier Performance 
 Compared to the literature on gender and tournaments, the literature on gender and teams 
are remarkably sparse. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) investigate the influence of gender 
composition on group decisions. In a dictator game setting, they find that groups are more 
generous and equalitarian when women are the majority. They also find that if the group has two 
men and a woman, it is considered to be the most generous group. In the field, Bagues and 
Esteve-Volart (2010) provide the evidence that the chances of individual’s success as the Corp of 
the Spanish Judiciary are affected by the gender composition of their evaluation committees. 
They find that female candidates have better chances of success with more males on the 
committees. This result provides the evidence that females play a significant role in determining 





management team, suggesting that females are less tradition and security oriented than their male 
counterparts. They are more risk seeking than males and having a woman on the board did not 
lead to more risk-averse decisions. Apesteguia et al. (2012) explore how the gender composition 
of teams affect their economic performance. They find that teams formed by three women are 
significantly outperformed by all other gender combinations due to less aggressive decisions 
such as pricing and investment. This result is consistent with Adams and Funk (2012) that 
females can make risky decisions in some circumstance. Therefore, we hypothesize that both-
female team will outperform compared to other teams. 




The experimental design addresses the following objectives: to determine the effects of 
gender composition on trust, trustworthiness, collaboration, and supply chain performance in 
buyer-supplier relationships. This study employed a 2 by 2 between-subject design, in which we 
manipulated gender composition in a buyer-supplier relationship (supplier’s gender—male 
versus female and retailer’s gender—male versus female). We abbreviate the treatments by FF, 
FM, MF, and MM, where F (M) stands for female (male) and the first letter indicates the gender 
of the supplier. Consistent with Schwieren and Sutter (2008), participants were informed about 
the gender of his/her partner by stating the first name. To avoid the confusion of International 
names, if the partner is a female, the first name is presented as Sarah. On the other hand, if the 





their own gender, we asked about their demographic information (e.g. gender, age, and 
education) at the beginning of the experiment.  
Participants 
A total of 214 participants (112 females and 102 males) was recruited from a large 
southern university, mostly undergraduates, from various fields of study who volunteered 
through an online recruitment system from a database of 3500 students at a medium-sized 
university in the US. The task was incentivized with cash based on subjects’ performance. 
Participants were paid their actual earnings after all subjects finished the post-experiment 
questionnaire, privately and in cash. They received an initial endowment of $5.00 for showing up 
at the lab. In addition, the average payment for the approximately 45-minute task was $10.21.  
The summary of the treatments is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary of the treatments 
  Supplier 
  Female Male 
Retailer Female FF (n=60) MF (n=52) Male FM (n=52) MM (n=50) 
Note. Half of the subjects play the role of supplier and the other half play the role of retailer. 
Experimental Procedure and Software 
Experimental procedure 
All 14 experimental sessions followed the similar protocol. Participants arrived at the 
computer lab at the designated time and were randomly and anonymously assigned to the role of 
either the supplier or the retailer at the beginning of the experiment. Subjects read the paper-
based instruction including two parts—general instruction with basic lab rule and payment 
structure and the forecasting task instruction. After finish reading instructions, subjects watched 





After the video instruction, subjects played a forecasting and production task for 23 periods 
which included 3 practice rounds. At the end of the experiment, all the subjects were asked to 
complete a post-experiment questionnaire with the manipulation checks and individual 
difference variables as control variables. 
Tasks and software 
Similar as Essay 1, I adapted the forecasting task from Ozer et al. (2014). There is a two-
tier supply chain with a supplier and a retailer. The supplier produces the product and sell it to 
the supplier. The retailer purchases the product from the supplier and sells it to the final 
customer. Since the retailer is closer to the final customers, he/she has better demand forecast 
information than the supplier. To better plan the production, the supplier wants to solicit the 
demand information before the demand is realized.  
In this Essay, the final customer demand is random and modeled as D=ξ+ε. The notion of 
ξ represents the retailer’s private forecast information that is only available to the retailer and the 
supplier only knows that it is a random variable distributed on [	ξ , ξ ]. The notation of ε is the 
market uncertainty of the product. Both parties only know that it is a zero-mean random variable 
distributed on [	ε , ε]. To ensure the demand is positive, we assume ξ + ε >0. 
In the experiment task, the retailer observes his /her private forecast information ξ and 
submits a report ξ to the supplier. In the next step, the supplier receives the report ξ and produces 
Q units of the product at the unit cost of c. After that, demand D is realized and the retailer 
purchases min (D, Q) from the supplier at a unit whole-sale price of w. In the last step, the 
retailer sells the product to the end customers at a unit retail price of r and both parties’ profits 





Given Q and ξ the supplier’s and retailer’s expected profits are 
The supplier’s expected profit: ∏%(',ξ)=w)εmin(ξ+ ε, Q)-cQ 
The retailer’s expected profit: ∏*(',ξ)=(r-w) )εmin(ξ+ ε, Q) 
In all treatments, r=150, w=100, c=50 to ensure that the cost of overstocking is equal to 
the cost of understocking, ξ and ε are uniformly distributed on [100, 400] and [-75, 75], 
respectively. The task is programmed in z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Measurement 
 Trustworthiness. The trustworthiness facets were adapting from Mayer and Davis 
(1999) and Colquitt and Rodell (2011) to assess the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the 
partner (either the supplier or the retailer). We used a scale ranging from 1, “strongly disagree,” 
to 7, “strongly agree” to evaluate the extent to which the subjects agreed with the statements in 
each scale.  
 Trust. The 4-item measurement of trust was adapted from Colquitt and Rodell (2011). 
The extent of the agreement was assessed on 7-point Likert Scale from 1, “strongly disagree,” to 










Table 2: Factor loadings for trust and trustworthiness 
Items Factor Loadings and Cronbach's α 
Trustworthiness (Ability) 0.901 
Sarah (Mike) is very capable of performing her job. 0.803 
Sarah (Mike) is known to be successful at the things she tries to 
do. 0.864 
Sarah (Mike) has a lot of knowledge about work to be done. 0.829 
I feel very confident about Sarah (Mike)’s skills. 0.876 
Sarah (Mike) is well qualified. 0.861 
Trustworthiness (Integrity) 0.870 
Sarah (Mike) has a strong sense of justice. 0.829 
I never have to wonder whether Sarah (Mike) will stick to her 
word. 0.859 
Sarah (Mike) tries hard to be fair in dealing with me. 0.853 
Sarah (Mike)’s actions and behaviors are not very consistent. 0.853 
Trustworthiness (Benevolence) 0.860 
Sarah (Mike) is very concerned about my welfare. 0.838 
My needs and desires are very important to Sarah (Mike). 0.816 
Sarah (Mike) would not knowingly do anything to hurt me. 0.855 
Sarah (Mike) will go out of her way to help me. 0.853 
Trust 0.880 
I would be comfortable giving Sarah (Mike) a task or problem 
that is critical to me, even if I could not monitor her actions. 0.874 
I would be willing to let Sarah (Mike) have complete control 
over our business in the relationship. 0.868 
I really wish I had a good way to keep an eye on Sarah (Mike). 0.843 
If I had my way, I wouldn’t let Sarah (Mike) have any influence 
over business that are important to me. 0.846 
 
 Collaboration. Different from trustworthiness and trust which were the perceptual 
measures, the supplier’s and retailer’s collaboration is objectively assessed. First, the retailer’s 
collaboration was measured by the forecast report inflation. If the retailer is collaborative, he/she 
is willing to report truthful information to his/her supplier to help them make the production 
plan. Second, the supplier’s collaboration was measured by the production reduction. If the 





will not reduce the production only to cut down the holding cost for himself/herself, but might 
lead to the unsatisfied demand. 
Results 
Test for Trustworthiness for Suppliers and Retailers 
 One-way ANOVA with gender composition (Female-Female vs. Male-Female vs. 
Female-Male vs. Male-Male) as the fixed factor and trustworthiness (ability) as the dependent 
variable was used. Results indicated that there was a significant effect of gender composition on 
trustworthiness (ability), F(1,210)=131.22, p<.001. To further interpret the results, the 
Bonferroni method was employed to compare each treatment. Results suggested that subjects in 
the Female-Female treatment (M=6.14) significantly trusted their partner’s ability more than 
those in the Male-Male treatment (M=5.66, p=0.04); subjects in the Male-Male treatment 
(M=5.66) significantly trusted their partner’s ability more than those in the Female-Male 
treatment (M=4.45, p<.001); subjects in the Female-Male treatment (M=4.45) significantly 
trusted their partner’s ability more than those in the Male-Female treatment (M=3.68, p<.001). 
 One-way ANOVA with gender composition (Female-Female vs. Male-Female vs. 
Female-Male vs. Male-Male) as the fixed factor and trustworthiness (Integrity) as the dependent 
variable was used. Results indicated that there was a significant effect of gender composition on 
trustworthiness (Integrity), F(1,210)=400.59, p<.001. To further interpret the results, the 
Bonferroni method was employed to compare each treatment. Results suggested that subjects in 
the Female-Female treatment (M=5.95) trusted their partner’s integrity in the similar level as 
those in the Male-Male treatment (M=5.93); subjects in the Female-Male treatment (M=2.94) 





(M=3.03); However, subjects in the Male-Male treatment and Female-Female treatment 
significantly trusted their partner’s integrity more than those in the Male-Female and Female-
Male treatments (p<.001).  
 To test the impact of gender composition on trustworthiness (benevolence), one-way 
ANOVA with gender composition (Female-Female vs. Male-Female vs. Female-Male vs. Male-
Male) as the fixed factor and trustworthiness (benevolence) as the dependent variable was used. 
Results provided the evidence that there was a significant effect of gender composition on 
trustworthiness (benevolence), F(1,210)=427.74, p<.001. To further interpret the results, the 
Bonferroni method was employed to compare each treatment. Results suggested that subjects in 
the Male-Male treatment (M=6.01) trusted their partner’s benevolence in the similar level as 
those in the Female-Female treatment (M=5.87); subjects in the Female-Male treatment 
(M=3.04) trusted their partner’s benevolence in the similar level as those in the Male-Female 
treatment (M=2.96); However, subjects in the Male-Male treatment and Female-Female 
treatment significantly trusted their partner’s benevolence more than those in the Male-Female 
and Female-Male treatments (p<.001).  
Test for Trust for Suppliers and Retailers 
To test the effect of gender composition on trust, one-way ANOVA with gender 
composition (Female-Female vs. Male-Female vs. Female-Male vs. Male-Male) as the fixed 
factor and trust as the dependent variable was used. Results indicated that there was a significant 
effect of gender composition on trust, F(1,210)=189.78, p<.001. To further interpret the results, 
the Bonferroni method was employed to compare each treatment. Results suggested that subjects 
in the Male-Male treatment (M=6.11) significantly trusted their partner more than those in the 





significantly trusted their partner more than those in the Female-Male treatment (M=3.51, 
p<.001); subjects in the Female-Male treatment (M=3.51) significantly trusted their partner more 
than those in the Male-Female treatment (M=3.13, p=.05). 
Test for Collaboration for Suppliers and Retailers 
 Retailers’ collaboration was measured by the forecast report inflation—the less the 
subjects inflated their report, the more they collaborated. Results from random effect indicated 
that retailers in Female-Female treatment had significantly less forecast inflation compared to 
those in the other three treatments, suggesting that female retailers were significantly more 
collaborative when their partners were females compared to the male retailers in the Male-Male 
treatment (χ2=387.86, p<.001), female retailers in the Male-Female treatment (χ2=114.8, p<.001), 
and male retailers in the Female-Male treatment (χ2=263.15, p<.001). Furthermore, male retailers 
were significantly more collaborative than female retailers in the Male-Female treatment 
(χ2=262.68, p<.001) and male retailers in the Female-Male treatment (χ261.65, p<.001). 
However, female retailers in the Male-Female treatment did not behave significantly different 
from the male retailers in terms of collaboration.  
Table 3: Treatment Comparisons 
Comparison Retailer forecast inflation 
Supplier production 
reduction SC performance 
Female-
Female Male-Male 9.68** 10.08** -359.00** 
 Male-Female 11.48** 14.28** -955.50** 
 Female-Male 6.61** 6.14** -657.35** 
Male-Male Male-Female 8.72** 8.23** -59.02 
 Female-Male 14.71** 17.08** 232.79 
Male-Female Female-Male 2.47 1.05 -352.55 
Note. p-values are derived from random effects. 





 Second, suppliers’ collaboration was measured by their production reduction (Q- ξ̂). 
Results from random effect provided evidence that female suppliers in the Female-Female 
treatment had significantly less production reduction among all four treatments, suggesting that 
female suppliers were significantly more collaborative when their partners were females 
compared to male suppliers in the Male-Male treatment (χ2=225.21, p<.001), female suppliers in 
the Male-Female treatment (χ2=539.68, p=.007), and male suppliers in the Female-Male 
treatment (χ2=192.14, p=.003). Furthermore, male suppliers were significantly more 
collaborative than female suppliers in the Male-Female treatment (χ2=522.37, p=.01) and male 
suppliers in the Female-Male treatment (χ2=290.52, p=.003). However, female suppliers in the 
Male-Female treatment did not behave significantly different from the male suppliers in terms of 
collaboration.  
Test for Supply Chain Performance  
 The above discussions demonstrate that gender composition significantly impacted the 
levels of trust, trustworthiness, and collaboration for both suppliers and retailers in a buyer-
supplier relationship. The next step is to quantify these impacts on the resulting supply chain 
performance. Supplier chain performance is calculated by the total of supplier’s expected profit 
(∏%(',ξ)=w)εmin(ξ+ ε, Q)-cQ) and retailer’s expected profit (∏*(',ξ)=(r-w) )εmin(ξ+ ε, Q)). 
Results indicated that Female-Female team earned significantly more profit than the other three 
gender composition. This result is consistent with the previous literature. However, profits 
among Male-Male team, Female-Male team, and Male-Female team were not significantly 






Discussions and Conclusions  
Current trends in the nature of workforce imply that mixed-gender teams will 
increasingly be called upon to perform work. The empirical literature suggests that this may 
create a problem in the sense that, on the traditional male-dominated tasks, teams that composed 
of all male members have been found to outperform teams that included female members 
(Wood, 1987). Essay 2 was designed to understand the influence of gender composition on trust, 
trustworthiness, collaboration, and performance in buyer-supplier relationships. We have shown 
that Female-Female teams were significantly outperformed among any other gender 
compositions. This result is consistent with Apesteguia et al. (2012). Several key findings 
emerged from this study. First, subjects in the same gender teams trusted their partner’s ability 
more than those in the different gender teams. Social identity theory can well-explain this 
finding—individuals identified with each other due to the same gender and generated the in-
group favoritism and out-group discrimination. Further, subjects in the Female-Female treatment 
trusted their partner’s ability more than those in the Male-Male treatment. This result indicated 
that females were more trustworthy than males. In addition, Male-Female treatment had the 
lowest trust in ability. This result suggested that males might have the stereotype that females 
could not do a math-related job such as forecasting well.  
 Second, in terms of integrity, subjects in the same gender treatments significantly trusted 
their partners’ integrity more than those in the different gender treatments. According to the 
social identity theory, identification created the positive in-group bias and people believed that 
their in-group members were doing favors to them.  
 Similarly, subjects in the same gender treatments trusted their partner’s benevolence 





subjects in the same gender treatments believed that their partners more concerned about their 
welfare and were more willing to help them compared to those in the different gender treatments. 
Consistent with previously literature, subjects tended to trust their in-group members more than 
their out-group members. Further, males trusted more than females especially when two males 
worked together.  
 In addition, when it came to the real behavior—collaboration, stories have been changed. 
Female retailers were most collaborative with their female partners and males retailers were least 
collaborative with their male partners in all gender composition teams. That might indicate that 
males were more competitive than females especially when they paired with another male. For 
suppliers who had to rely on their retailers’ forecast report to make the production, the in-group 
favoritism played a role again. Subjects in the same gender treatments cut down their production 
reduction less compared to those in the different gender treatments. This result provided the 
evidence that they were more collaborative. This might be explained by the trust concept that 
subjects trusted their in-group members more than their out-group members, thus they were more 
collaborative.  
 Consistent with previous literature, the Female-Female team was outperformed among 
the other three team compositions. This result provided the evidence that females are important 






Adams, R. B., & Funk, P. (2012). Beyond the glass ceiling: does gender matter? Management 
Science, 58(2), 219-235. 
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trusts others? Journal of Public Economics, 85(2), 
207-234. 
Allen, V. L., & Wilder, D. A. (1975). Categorization, belief similarity, and intergroup 
discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(6), 971. 
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and identity. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 715-753. 
Andersson, J. (2001). The net effect of memory collaboration: How is collaboration affected by 
factors such as friendship, gender and age? Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 42(4), 367-375. 
Andreoni, J., & Vesterlund, L. (2001). Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 293-312. 
Apesteguia, J., Azmat, G., & Iriberri, N. (2012). The impact of gender composition on team 
performance and decision making: Evidence from the field. Management Science, 58(1), 78-93. 
Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 20-39. 
Bagues, M. F., & Esteve-Volart, B. (2010). Can gender parity break the glass ceiling? Evidence 
from a repeated randomized experiment. The Review of Economic Studies, 77(4), 1301-1328. 
Bargh, J. A. (2006). What have we been priming all these years? On the development, 
mechanisms, and ecology of nonconscious social behavior. European Journal of Social 
psychology, 36(2), 147-168. 
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American 
psychologist, 54(7), 462. 






Bellemare, C., & Kröger, S. (2007). On representative social capital. European Economic 
Review, 51(1), 183-202. 
Blasgen, R. (2011). A world of opportunities for women in SCM. CSCMP’s Supply Chain 
Quarterly (3). http://www.supplychainquarterly.com/columns/201103directconnection/ 
Bohnet, I. (2007). Why women and men trust others. Economics and Psychology, 89-110. 
Borghans, L., Heckman, J. J., Golsteyn, B. H., & Meijers, H. (2009). Gender differences in risk 
aversion and ambiguity aversion. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-3), 649-
658. 
Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-
motivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86(2), 307. 
Brody, L. R. (1993). On understanding gender differences in the expression of emotion. Human 
feelings: Explorations in affect development and meaning, 87-121. 
Buchan, N. R., Croson, R. T., & Solnick, S. (2008). Trust and gender: An examination of 
behavior and beliefs in the Investment Game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
68(3), 466-476. 
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125(3), 367. 
Carter, J. B., Banister, E. W., & Blaber, A. P. (2003). Effect of endurance exercise on autonomic 
control of heart rate. Sports Medicine, 33(1), 33-46. 
Charness, G., & Gneezy, U. (2012). Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1), 50-58. 
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., & Rustichini, A. (2007). Individual behavior and group membership. 
The American Economic Review, 97(4), 1340-1352. 
Charness, G., & Rustichini, A. (2011). Gender differences in cooperation with group 





Chaudhuri, A., & Gangadharan, L. (2007). An experimental analysis of trust and trustworthiness. 
Southern Economic Journal, 959-985. 
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009). Group identity and social preferences. The American Economic 
Review, 99(1), 431-457. 
Chen, Y., Li, S. X., Liu, T. X., & Shih, M. (2014). Which hat to wear? Impact of natural 
identities on coordination and cooperation. Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 58-86. 
Clark, K., & Sefton, M. (2001). The sequential prisoner's dilemma: evidence on reciprocation. 
The Economic Journal, 111(468), 51-68. 
Colquitt, J. A., & Rodell, J. B. (2011). Justice, trust, and trustworthiness: A longitudinal analysis 
integrating three theoretical perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 54(6), 1183-1206. 
Conway, A. R., Cowan, N., & Bunting, M. F. (2001). The cocktail party phenomenon revisited: 
The importance of working memory capacity. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(2), 331-335. 
Cox, J. C., & Deck, C. A. (2006). When are women more generous than men? Economic Inquiry, 
44(4), 587-598. 
Croson, R., & Buchan, N. (1999). Gender and culture: International experimental evidence from 
trust games. The American Economic Review, 89(2), 386-391. 
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic 
literature, 47(2), 448-474. 
Crosby, F., Bromley, S., & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent unobtrusive studies of Black and White 
discrimination and prejudice: A literature review. Psychological Bulletin, 87(3), 546-563. 
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex (Vol. 1). Murray. 
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31(1), 169-193. 
Delfgaauw, J., Dur, R., Sol, J., & Verbeke, W. (2013). Tournament incentives in the field: 





Dittmar, H., Beattie, J., & Friese, S. (1995). Gender identity and material symbols: Objects and 
decision considerations in impulse purchases. Journal of Economic Psychology, 16(3), 491-511. 
Dufwenberg, M., & Muren, A. (2006). Gender composition in teams. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 61(1), 50-54. 
Dulleck, U., & Kerschbamer, R. (2006). On doctors, mechanics, and computer specialists: The 
economics of credence goods. Journal of Economic literature, 44(1), 5-42. 
Eagly, A. H., & Crowley, M. (1986). Gender and helping behavior: A meta-analytic review of 
the social psychological literature. Psychological Bulletin, 100(3), 283. 
Eckel, C. C., & Füllbrunn, S. C. (2015). That she blows? Gender, competition, and bubbles in 
experimental asset markets. The American Economic Review, 105(2), 906-920. 
Eckel, C., & Grossman, P. (1997). Equity and fairness in economic decisions: Evidence from 
bargaining experiments. Advances in Economic Psychology, 281-301. 
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1998). Are women less selfish than men? Evidence from 
dictator experiments. The Economic Journal, 108(448), 726-735. 
Eckel, C., & Wilson, R. K. (2004). Whom to trust? Choice of partner in a trust game. 
Department of Economics, Virginia Tech. 
Egan, S. K., & Perry, D. G. (2001). Gender identity: a multidimensional analysis with 
implications for psychosocial adjustment. Developmental Psychology, 37(4), 451. 
Ely, R. J. (1995). The power in demography: Women's social constructions of gender identity at 
work. Academy of Management Journal, 38(3), 589-634. 
Farrell, K. A., & Hersch, P. L. (2005). Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1), 85-106. 
Feingold, A. (1994). Gender differences in personality: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 
116(3), 429. 
Felton, J., Gibson, B., & Sanbonmatsu, D. M. (2003). Preference for risk in investing as a 





Garbarino, E., & Slonim, R. (2009). The robustness of trust and reciprocity across a 
heterogeneous US population. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69(3), 226-240. 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Harvard University Press. 
Gneezy, U., Leonard, K. L., & List, J. A. (2009). Gender differences in competition: Evidence 
from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society. Econometrica, 77(5), 1637-1664. 
Gneezy, U., Niederle, M., & Rustichini, A. (2003). Performance in competitive environments: 
Gender differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics-Cambridge Massachusetts, 118(3), 1049-
1074. 
Guth, W., Schmidt, C., & Sutter, M. (2007). Bargaining outside the lab–a newspaper experiment 
of a three-person ultimatum game. The Economic Journal, 117(518), 449-469. 
Handy, C. (1995). Trust and the virtual organization. Harvard Business Review, 73(3), 40. 
Healy, A., & Pate, J. (2011). Can teams help to close the gender competition gap? The Economic 
Journal, 121(555), 1192-1204. 
Hersch, J. (1997). Smoking, seat belts, and other risky consumer decisions: Differences by 
gender and race. Managerial & Decision Economics, 11, 471–481. 
Hewstone, M. (1996). Contact and categorization: Social psychological. Stereotypes and 
stereotyping, 323. 
Hong, L., & Page, S. E. (2001). Problem solving by heterogeneous agents. Journal of economic 
theory, 97(1), 123-163. 
Inzlicht, M., & Ben-Zeev, T. (2000). A threatening intellectual environment: Why females are 
susceptible to experiencing problem-solving deficits in the presence of males. Psychological 
Science, 11(5), 365-371. 
Irwin, K., Edwards, K., & Tamburello, J. A. (2015). Gender, trust and cooperation in 
environmental social dilemmas. Social Science Research, 50, 328-342. 
Kellert, S. R., & Berry, J. K. (1987). Attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors toward wildlife as 





Kristof, N. (2009). Mistresses of the Universe. The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/opinion/08kristof.html 
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences 
reveal about the real world? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2), 153-174. 
Loch, C. H., & Wu, Y. (2008). Social preferences and supply chain performance: An 
experimental study. Management Science, 54(11), 1835-1849. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. 
Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), 267. 
Maccoby, E. E. (1992). The role of parents in the socialization of children: An historical 
overview. Developmental Psychology, 28(6), 1006. 
Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for 
management: A field quasi-experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(1), 123. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational 
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709-734. 
Mayer, R. C., & Gavin, M. B. (2005). Trust in management and performance: Who minds the 
shop while the employees watch the boss? Academy of Management Journal, 48(5), 874-888. 
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal 
cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 24-59. 
McGlone, M. S., & Aronson, J. (2006). Stereotype threat, identity salience, and spatial 
reasoning. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 27(5), 486-493. 
Migheli, M. (2007). Trust, gender and social capital: Experimental evidence from three western 
European countries. Available at SSRN 976380. 
Niederle, M., Segal, C., & Vesterlund, L. (2013). How costly is diversity? Affirmative action in 
light of gender differences in competitiveness. Management Science, 59(1), 1-16. 
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete 





Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Math= male, me= female, therefore 
math≠ me. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(1), 44. 
Nowell, C., & Tinkler, S. (1994). The influence of gender on the provision of a public good. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 25(1), 25-36. 
Orbell, J., Dawes, R., & Schwartz-Shea, P. (1994). Trust, social categories, and individuals: The 
case of gender. Motivation and Emotion, 18(2), 109-128. 
Ortmann, A., & Tichy, L. K. (1999). Gender differences in the laboratory: evidence from 
prisoner’s dilemma games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 39(3), 327-339. 
Ostrov, J. M., & Keating, C. F. (2004). Gender differences in preschool aggression during free 
play and structured interactions: An observational study. Social Development, 13(2), 255-277. 
Oswald, D. L., Clark, E. M., & Kelly, C. M. (2004). Friendship maintenance: An analysis of 
individual and dyad behaviors. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 23(3), 413. 
Özer, Ö., Zheng, Y., & Ren, Y. (2014). Trust, trustworthiness, and information sharing in supply 
chains bridging China and the United States. Management Science, 60(10), 2435-2460. 
Powell, M., & Ansic, D. (1997). Gender differences in risk behaviour in financial decision-
making: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 18(6), 605-628. 
Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner's dilemma: A study in conflict and 
cooperation (Vol. 165). University of Michigan press. 
Robichaud, M., Dugas, M. J., & Conway, M. (2003). Gender differences in worry and associated 
cognitive-behavioral variables. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17(5), 501-516. 
Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (2007). An integrative model of organizational 
trust: Past, present, and future. Academy of Management Review, 32(2), 344-354. 
Schwieren, C., & Sutter, M. (2008). Trust in cooperation or ability? An experimental study on 
gender differences. Economics Letters, 99(3), 494-497. 
Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L., & Ambady, N. (1999). Stereotype susceptibility: Identity salience and 





Simatupang, T. M., & Sridharan, R. (2002). The collaborative supply chain. The International 
Journal of Jogistics Management, 13(1), 15-30. 
Solnick, S. J. (2001). Gender differences in the ultimatum game. Economic Inquiry, 39(2), 189. 
Solnick, S. J., & Schweitzer, M. E. (1999). The influence of physical attractiveness and gender 
on ultimatum game decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79(3), 
199-215. 
Steele, J. R., & Ambady, N. (2006). “Math is Hard!” The effect of gender priming on women’s 
attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(4), 428-436. 
Stevens, C. K., Bavetta, A. G., & Gist, M. E. (1993). Gender differences in the acquisition of 
salary negotiation skills: the role of goals, self-efficacy, and perceived control. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 78(5), 723. 
Stewart, A. J., & McDermott, C. (2004). Gender in psychology. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 55, 519-
544. 
Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Walters, A. E. (1999). Gender differences in negotiation outcome: A 
meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 52(3), 653-677. 
Sutter, M. (2009). Individual behavior and group membership: Comment. The American 
Economic Review, 99(5), 2247-2257. 
Sutter, M., Bosman, R., Kocher, M. G., & van Winden, F. (2009). Gender pairing and 
bargaining—Beware the same sex! Experimental Economics, 12(3), 318-331. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33(47), 74. 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). 
Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Basil Blackwell. 
Wilder, D. A. (1986). Social categorization: Implications for creation and reduction of intergroup 





Zinkhan, G. M., & Karande, K. W. (1991). Cultural and gender differences in risk-taking 
behavior among American and Spanish decision makers. The Journal of Social Psychology, 
131(5), 741-742. 
Zinovyeva, N., & Bagues, M. (2010). Does gender matter for academic promotion? Evidence 













This dissertation investigated and obtained a holistic understanding of the importance and 
impacts of identity on collaboration, trust, trustworthiness, and performance in buyer-supplier 
relationships. By considering two types of identity—induced identity and natural identity, this 
dissertation employed controlled lab experiments to provide interesting insights and 
contributions. Taken as a whole, several grand findings and contributions of this dissertation 
emerged to understand the identity issues in buyer-supplier relationships.   
 In a grand scheme, this dissertation provided the evidence that identity acted as a non-
economic factor that could promote discretionary collaboration, trust, trustworthiness, and 
increase performance in buyer-supplier relationships. Previous literature has shown that 
economic incentives and complete contracts could make retailers and suppliers work together 
toward the common goals and mutual benefits. However, how to motivate self-interested 
individuals to voluntarily collaborate becomes the issue. Even though the monetary incentive is 
the most common method to promote collaboration between suppliers and retailers, it does have 
downsides such as crowding out the intrinsic motivation or leading to dishonesty. The contract 
can prevent the negative sides of monetary incentives, but it is costly to make a complete 
contract. Therefore, this dissertation introduced identity as the non-economic factor that can 
promote discretionary collaboration which would avoid the negative sides of the monetary 
incentives and incomplete contracts.  
 In Essay 1, I introduced the buyer-supplier identification—the induced identity to supply 
chain management literature. By creating the identity between an employee from the 
supplier/retailer firm and a retailer/supplier firm (the employee generated the identity with 
his/her partner’s firm), I am able to understand that the buyer-supplier identification can increase 





willing to sacrifice their own interest to benefit their partners and the supply chain with the 
presence of buyer-supplier identification. This result indicated that opportunism might be 
reduced between suppliers and retailers since they treated each other as their in-group members 
and they were no longer self-profit oriented agents. Supply chain managers may consider using 
buyer-supplier identification to work more effectively and efficiently with their supply chain 
partners. For example, even though there is goal incongruence between suppliers and retailers, 
buyer-supplier identification might be strong enough to avoid the negative impacts. 
 Second, this study also explored the foundation and formation of buyer-supplier 
identification. There are different ways to manipulate buyer-supplier identification from the 
minimum group paradigm to collocation. Previous literature has already shown that the trivial 
things such as assigning subjects into green/red groups or forming groups by painting 
preferences are sufficient enough to trigger identity. However, this study provided evidence that 
collocation might further enhance the identity between suppliers and retailers. This result might 
be able to explain the phenomenon in practice that major retailers highly recommend their 
suppliers to have dedicated teams that collocate with them. This result suggested that beyond the 
operational benefits such as more information sharing or faster decision-making process, 
collocation could also bring behavioral benefits such as creating buyer-supplier identification. 
Further, the buyer-supplier identification created through collocation can promote discretionary 
collaboration which benefited both suppliers and retailers and the supply chain. Supply chain 
managers may consider using the above methods to form buyer-supplier identification. For 
example, simply sharing the same email address between suppliers and retailers’ firms may be 
sufficient enough to trigger buyer-supplier identification. Providing T-shirt with joint company 





Further, team-building activities can be used to enhance buyer-supplier identification. Managers 
may use team-building events outside the business to make employees work together. In 
addition, dedicated team collocation is the strongest way to create buyer-supplier identification. 
Therefore, even though it is costly for suppliers to have a dedicated team to collocate with the 
major retailers, it might be worth investing the money. 
 Third, results indicated that suppliers benefit more than retailers by generating buyer-
supplier identification. This helps us further understand collocation. Power exists in many buyer-
supplier relationships, and in most cases, retailers are more powerful than suppliers. People may 
argue that collocation with the retailer is the result of the retailer’s power. However, the result 
from this study clearly shows that suppliers can earn more profits by collocating with their 
partners. Therefore, power might be one of the reasons that promote collocation, but it is not the 
only reason.  
 As we discussed before, power exits in the buyer-supplier relationships. Future research 
may take power into consideration when exploring identity issues. For example, is it different to 
form buyer-supplier identification in the power imbalanced relationships? Second, this study 
only explored the two-tier supply chain—a relationship between one supplier and one retailer. In 
the real world, a major retailer has several major suppliers to provide similar products. If the 
focal supplier has generated the buyer-supplier identification with the major retailer, how does 
he/she treat the major retailer’s other suppliers? Does the focal supplier treat other suppliers who 
offer the similar products as competitors or in-group members? Third, as the world developed, 
global supply chain becomes more and more popular. The retailer located in the US may have 





may generate different ways to create buyer-supplier identification with various cultures. Future 
research may explore the formation and foundation of identity under different cultures. 
In Essay 2, the focus was the impact of gender identity. Previous literature has 
documented the gender differences in various aspects such as risk preference, social preference, 
and competition. This study examined the impact of gender composition on trust, 
trustworthiness, collaboration, and performance in buyer-supplier relationships. The result 
suggested that Female-Female teams were significantly outperformed among any other gender 
compositions. Supply chain is a male-dominated career, and according to this result, bringing 
more females to the supply chain field could improve the supply chain performance. Supply 
chain managers may consider having a female employee in the buyer-supplier relationships if the 
partner is a female.  
Second, according to social identity theory, same gender teams exhibited higher level of 
trust and trustworthiness. The results from this essay provided similar conclusions. Supply chain 
managers may consider using the same gender composition as a criterion to assign employees if 
they want to achieve higher level of trust and trustworthiness. If the partner is a female, it might 
be better to assign another female to work with her. On the contrary, if the partner is a male, 
assigning another male to work with him might achieve efficiency and effectiveness.  
 However, males exhibited inconsistency with their perceptions and real behaviors. When 
it comes to the real behavior—collaboration, stories have changed for males. Even though males 
stated that they trusted their male partners more than their female partners, they competed more 
with their male partners in the real task than their female partners. Therefore, competition among 
males can dominate the in-group favoritism. Males can form groups by their gender, but they 





more consistent with their perceptions and real behaviors in this study. Female retailers were 
significantly more collaborative with their female partners. When forming relationships, 
managers may consider avoiding the male-male group due to the nature of competition among 
males. This result provided further evidence that females played a significant positive role in 
buyer-supplier relationships.   
 Gender is not the only part of individuals’ natural identity. Ethnicity is another factor that 
might change individuals’ behaviors. As the world becomes more and more diverse, how to 
promote people from different backgrounds to work together is the key for firms to succeed and 
survive. Therefore, how gender and ethnicity twisted with each other to impact individuals’ 
decision-making is another direction to go for the future research. 
 
	
	
	
113 
 
V. APPENDIX 
 
	
	
	
114 
 
